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The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking

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  • Bruce L. Benson

    (Florida State University
    Appalachian State University
    Texas Tech University)

Abstract

The purposes of this presentation are to (1) provide a relatively short coherent picture of predatory states, (2) pull some of North, Wallis and Weingast’s important arguments, particularly from their discussion of “natural states”, into predatory state analysis, including their fundamental elements of “violence, organizations, institutions and beliefs”; and (3) criticize the kinds of assumptions public-interest views rely on by using NWW’s very public-interest and non-public-choice depiction of the “open access order” as a way to reveal some of those assumptions. Even if states provide public goods, the primary focus for politicians appears to be on transferring wealth to themselves and/or to elites and interest groups. Most states also have engaged in aggression to expand their jurisdictions. Predatory-state theories focuses on wealth transfers and aggression. These models explain states’ historical development and many observed state actions. Perhaps surprisingly, they even provide a theoretical explanation of public-good provision. The primary conclusion is that states, including the U.S., are predatory. Consideration of violence, organizations, institutions, and beliefs adds power to this contention. Observed state institutions and organization are consistent with an evolved predatory state. Examination of a number of explicit or implicit institutional and organizational assumptions supporting public-interest views of states further reinforces the contention. These assumptions either do not hold, or hold only in part.

Suggested Citation

  • Bruce L. Benson, 2020. "The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 303-329, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00667-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00667-7
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    3. Victor I. Espinosa & José Antonio Peña-Ramos & Fátima Recuero-López, 2021. "The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking: Evidence from Spain’s Support Policies for Renewable Energy," Energies, MDPI, vol. 14(14), pages 1-16, July.

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