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War, Pillage, and Markets

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  • Rider, Robert

Abstract

Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperati ve relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic mode l of Hobbes' world, the author shows that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varyin g degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, he shows how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Rider, Robert, 1993. "War, Pillage, and Markets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 149-156, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:75:y:1993:i:2:p:149-56
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    Cited by:

    1. Charles Anderton & John Carter, 2004. "Vulnerable Trade: The Dark Side of an Edgeworth Box," Working Papers 0411, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    2. Emmanuel Athanassiou, 2003. "The internal control constraint on compliance," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(6), pages 413-424.
    3. Charles Anderton, 1998. "Appropriation, Deterrence, and Trade Policy in a Simple Exchange Economy," Working Papers 9801, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics.
    4. Chelsea A. Pardini & Ana Espinola-Arredondo, 2021. "Violence, coercion, and settler colonialism," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 33(2), pages 236-273, April.
    5. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April.
    6. Anderton, Charles H. & Carter, John R., 2008. "Vulnerable trade: The dark side of an Edgeworth box," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 422-432, November.
    7. Bruce L. Benson, 2020. "The development and evolution of predatory-state institutions and organizations: beliefs, violence, conquest, coercion, and rent seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 303-329, March.
    8. Bruce Benson, 2018. "The institutional determinants of self-governance: a comment on Edward Stringham’s Private Governance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 209-230, June.
    9. Anderton, Charles H., 1999. "Appropriation possibilities in a simple exchange economy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 77-83, April.

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