War, Pillage, and Markets
Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperati ve relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic mode l of Hobbes' world, the author shows that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varyin g degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, he shows how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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