IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

War, Pillage, and Markets

Listed author(s):
  • Rider, Robert
Registered author(s):

    Neoclassical economic theory has produced an extensive body of knowledge about market exchange based on cooperati ve relations: private property. This leads to an artificial dichotomy between cooperation and conflict though. It is best to view market exchange as lying along a continuum of conflict and cooperation. Conflict and cooperation are intertwined. From a game theoretic mode l of Hobbes' world, the author shows that a number of property rights structures are possible. Each is characterized as possessing varyin g degrees of conflict and cooperation. Finally, from a repeated game, he shows how conflictual relations (mutual predation) may support more cooperative relations (private property). This new equilibrium is sub-game perfect. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 75 (1993)
    Issue (Month): 2 (February)
    Pages: 149-156

    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:75:y:1993:i:2:p:149-56
    Contact details of provider: Web page:

    Order Information: Web:

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:75:y:1993:i:2:p:149-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Rebekah McClure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.