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Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England

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  • Benson, Bruce L

Abstract

A series of property rights alterations made by the English government undermined individuals' incentives to cooperate in the production of both policing and road maintenance, ultimately leading to government production. The result is more accurately characterized as a free-access common pool than as a public good. Common-pool analysis suggests an array of possible policy prescriptions involving the internalization of costs and benefits through privatization of rights. In contrast, the public-goods concept appears to be simply an ex post justification for claiming that the only efficient policy is public provision of these services at zero money prices. Copyright 1994 by Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Benson, Bruce L, 1994. "Are Public Goods Really Common Pools? Considerations of the Evolution of Policing and Highways in England," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 249-271, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:32:y:1994:i:2:p:249-71
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Koyama, Mark, 2012. "The Law and Economics of Private Prosecutions in Industrial Revolution England," MPRA Paper 40500, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bruce Benson, 1994. "Emerging from the Hobbesian jungle: Might takes and makes rights," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 129-158, March.
    3. JEAN-MICHEL Josselin & ALAIN Marciano, 1997. "The Paradox of Leviathan: How to Develop and Contain the Future European State?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 5-22, January.
    4. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    5. Edward Stringham, 2014. "Extending the Analysis of Spontaneous Market Order to Governance," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(2), pages 171-180, June.
    6. Andrew Young, 2015. "From Caesar to Tacitus: changes in early Germanic governance circa 50 BC-50 AD," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(3), pages 357-378, September.
    7. Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, 2009. "Public choice and the economic analysis of anarchy: a survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 503-538, September.
    8. Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman, 2010. "Conclusion," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 20 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Fred S. McChesney, 2010. "The Economic Analysis of Corruption," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 9 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    10. Blackstone, Erwin A. & Buck, Andrew J. & Hakim, Simon, 2005. "Evaluation of alternative policies to combat false emergency calls," Evaluation and Program Planning, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 233-242, May.
    11. Daniel D’Amico, 2010. "The prison in economics: private and public incarceration in Ancient Greece," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(3), pages 461-482, December.
    12. Klein, D.B. & Yin, C., 1994. "The Private Provision of Frontier Infrastructure: Toll Roads in California, 1850-1902," Papers 94-95-4, California Irvine - School of Social Sciences.
    13. Bruce L. Benson, 2015. "Regulation As a Barrier to Market Provision and to Innovation: The Case of Toll Roads and Steam Carriages in England," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 30(Spring 20), pages 61-87.
    14. Bruce Benson, 2006. "Contractual nullification of economically-detrimental state-made laws," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 19(2), pages 149-187, June.
    15. Nicholas A. Curott & Edward Peter Stringham, 2010. "The Historical Development of Public Policing, Prosecution and Punishment," Chapters,in: Handbook on the Economics of Crime, chapter 5 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Kenneth Avio, 1998. "The Economics of Prisons," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 143-175, September.
    17. Mark Koyama, 2012. "Prosecution Associations in Industrial Revolution England: Private Providers of Public Goods?," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 95-130.
    18. George Halkos & Nicholas Kyriazis, 2003. "Property Rights and Game-Theory Implications of Satellite Communications: The Bilateral Case of Greece and Russia," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 233-250, May.
    19. repec:bla:ajecsc:v:76:y:2017:i:5:p:1107-1132 is not listed on IDEAS
    20. Walter BLOCK, 2016. "Anti-aircraft Missiles and Gun Control," Journal of Social and Administrative Sciences, KSP Journals, vol. 3(2), pages 77-82, June.
    21. Benson, Bruce L. & Siddiqui, Zafar R., 2014. "Pashtunwali—Law for the lawless, defense for the stateless," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 108-120.
    22. Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman (ed.), 2010. "Handbook on the Economics of Crime," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13180.

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