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Ekonomia kontra polityka: niebezpieczne rady w kwestiach polityki ekonomicznej

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  • Daron Acemoglu
  • James A. Robinson

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  • Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2013. "Ekonomia kontra polityka: niebezpieczne rady w kwestiach polityki ekonomicznej," Gospodarka Narodowa. The Polish Journal of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, issue 11-12, pages 113-136.
    • Handle: RePEc:sgh:gosnar:y:2013:i:11-12:p:113-136
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    4. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, 2000. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 115(4), pages 1167-1199.
    5. Nelson, Richard R., 2011. "Dani Rodrik, One Economics Many Recipes: Globalization, Institutions, and Economic Growth , Princeton University Press, Princeton (2007) ISBN 978-0-691-14117-6 263 pages, Paperback," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 97-98, February.
    6. Acemoglu,Daron & Robinson,James A., 2009. "Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671422.
    7. Herbst, Jeffrey, 1990. "The structural adjustment of politics in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 18(7), pages 949-958, July.
    8. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & Pablo Querubin & James A. Robinson, 2008. "When Does Policy Reform Work? The Case of Central Bank Independence," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 39(1 (Spring), pages 351-429.
    9. Pischke, Jorn-Steffen & Dinardo, John & Hallock, Kevin F, 2000. "Unions And The Labour Market For Managers," CEPR Discussion Papers 2418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson & James Robinson, 2005. "The Rise of Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 546-579, June.
    11. Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Dictators and oligarchs: A dynamic theory of contested property rights," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 1-13, February.
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    27. Timothy Besley, 2007. "The New Political Economy," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(524), pages 570-587, November.
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