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A theory of predatory welfare state and citizen welfare: the French case

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  • Mehrdad Vahabi

    (Université Paris 13, Sorbonne Paris Cité)

  • Philippe Batifoulier

    (Université Paris 13, Sorbonne Paris Cité)

  • Nicolas Silva

    (Université Paris 13, Sorbonne Paris Cité)

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that the welfare state is an outcome of modern mass (total) warfare. The total war economy requires the participation of all citizens, erasing the differences between the military and citizens. Consequently, the war economy benefits from succoring the civilian population. The total war effect explains why a predatory state undertakes welfare programs, one of the contributions of the present paper. While the welfare state is closely related to total warfare, social welfare is not. Fraternal social welfare organizations in the United States predate the New Deal and the rise of welfare state. Similarly, the French welfare system was born as citizen welfare and not as state welfare. In fact, welfare programs were initiated in 1871 during the Paris Commune by workers under the name of la sociale and were recreated as self-managed citizen groups in 1945 before being displaced by government welfare programs. A second contribution of this paper is to explore the re-appropriation effect, or the way self-managed citizen welfare was transformed into a welfare state through a three-stage reform process manifesting itself in 1946, 1967 and 1996.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehrdad Vahabi & Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Silva, 2020. "A theory of predatory welfare state and citizen welfare: the French case," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 243-271, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:182:y:2020:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00660-0
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00660-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas da Silva, 2020. "Mutualité et capitalisme entre 1789 et 1947 : de la subversion à l'intégration," Post-Print hal-03228414, HAL.
    2. Pierre-Yves Hénin & Ahmet Insel, 2021. "Hungary's U-turn in Kornai's system paradigm perspective: a case for national authoritarian capitalism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 235-245, April.
    3. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2021. "Introduction: a special issue in honoring Janos Kornai," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(1), pages 1-13, April.
    4. Philippe Batifoulier & Rainer Diaz-Bone, 2022. "Perspectives on the economics and sociology of health. Contributions from the institutionalist approach of economics of convention -an introduction," Working Papers hal-03584852, HAL.
    5. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2020. "Introduction: a symposium on the predatory state," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 233-242, March.
    6. Vahabi, Mehrdad, 2020. "نئولیبرالیسم و مقابله با تورم [The Neoliberalism and the Inflation Control]," MPRA Paper 102539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Vahabi, Mehrdad & Klebaner, Samuel, 2023. "Une nouvelle perspective sur la prédation, le conflit, le capitalisme et le changement institutionne (Une évaluation critique de l’école de régulation), entretien de Mehrdad Vahabi avec Samuel Klebane," MPRA Paper 119567, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Bálint Madlovics & Bálint Magyar, 2021. "Post-communist predation: modeling reiderstvo practices in contemporary predatory states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 187(3), pages 247-273, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Citizen welfare; La Sociale; Predatory state; State re-appropriation effect; Total war effect; Welfare state;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development

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