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The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s

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  • Randall G. Holcombe

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  • Randall G. Holcombe, 1996. "The Growth of the Federal Government in the 1920s," Cato Journal, Cato Journal, Cato Institute, vol. 16(2), pages 175-199, Fall.
    • Handle: RePEc:cto:journl:v:16:y:1996:i:12:p:175-199
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    File URL: http://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1996/11/cj16n2-2.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Metzer, Jacob, 1985. "How New Was the New Era? The Public Sector in the 1920s," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(01), pages 119-126, March.
    2. Anderson, Gary M & Tollison, Robert D, 1991. "Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 161-175, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas da Silva & Mehrdad Vahabi, 2019. "A theory of predatory welfare state and citizen welfare: the French case," CEPN Working Papers hal-02073247, HAL.
    2. Mehrdad Vahabi & Philippe Batifoulier & Nicolas Silva, 2020. "A theory of predatory welfare state and citizen welfare: the French case," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(3), pages 243-271, March.
    3. Thomas A. Garrett & Andrew F. Kozak & Russell M. Rhine, 2010. "Institutions and government growth: a comparison of the 1890s and the 1930s," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 92(Mar), pages 109-120.
    4. Peter J. Boettke & Liya Palagashvili, 2015. "Taming Leviathan," Supreme Court Economic Review, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 279-303.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R00 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - General - - - General
    • Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General

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