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Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution

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  • Jonathan Rodden

    (Stanford University)

Abstract

Why do some federations implement highly progressive intergovernmental transfer schemes while others do not? First, this essay establishes some stylized facts, using provincial-level data from nine federations to measure the extent of inter-regional redistribution achieved through intergovernmental transfers in each country. Second, it explores sources of institutional variation that might help account for these persistent cross-country differences, focusing on theories of legislative bargaining, representation, and the distribution of income across regions. Third, it examines the historical conditions under which the basic institutions of federalism were selected.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Rodden, 2009. "Federalism and Inter-Regional Redistribution," Working Papers 2009/3, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    • Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:doc2009-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Giuseppe C.Ruggeri, 2009. "Regional Fiscal Flows: Measurement Tools," Working Papers 2009/4, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    2. Albert Solé-Ollé, 2013. "Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 229-252, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Federalism; redistribution; inter-governmental transfers; representation.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects

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