Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe
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Other versions of this item:
- Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R, 1994. "Fiscal Flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for Monetary Union in Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 1057, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
References listed on IDEAS
- Xavier Sala-i-Martin & Jeffrey Sachs, 1991.
"Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe From the United States,"
NBER Working Papers
3855, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Sachs, Jeffrey & Sala-i-Martin, Xavier, 1992. "Fiscal Federalism and Optimum Currency Areas: Evidence for Europe from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 632, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Robin W. Boadway & Frank R. Flatters, 1982. "Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 15(4), pages 613-633, November.
- Gallant, A. Ronald & Jorgenson, Dale W., 1979. "Statistical inference for a system of simultaneous, non-linear, implicit equations in the context of instrumental variable estimation," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2-3), pages 275-302.
- Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Paul Masson & Jacques Melitz, 1991. "Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 113-136, June.
More about this item
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
- H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
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