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L'union économique et monétaire : principes et implications

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  • Jean Pisani-Ferry
  • Claude Bismut

Abstract

[fre] L'union économique et monétaire Principes et implications. . L'intégration monétaire comporte à la fois des coûts et des bénéfices. Cependant, les Européens ont une forte aversion pour l'instabilité des changes. De ce point de vue, le SME a montré ses limites, et son dépassement dans la monnaie unique apparaît alors comme une nécessité. Tel est le sens du projet d'UEM contenu dans le traité de Maastricht. On en examine ici les grands choix : indépendance de la Banque centrale, discipline budgétaire et coordination des politiques économiques. Par suite, on discute les conséquences de l'UEM pour la politique économique de la France. Si la contrainte extérieure disparaît, le secteur public ne pourra contourner sa contrainte de solvabilité. L'instrument de politique monétaire nationale ne sera plus disponible. L'absorption des chocs asymétriques exigera une plus grande flexibilité salariale mais la politique budgétaire jouera un rôle accru. [eng] Economic and monetary union : principles and implications. . Monetary integration involves costs as well as benefits. Europeans, however, are adverse to exchange rate instability. As the ERM has reached its limits, the appropriate answer is to move to full monetary union. This is the goal of the EMU project in the Maastricht treaty. This article reviews the treaty's major choices : central bank independence, fiscal discipline, and economic policy coordination. It also discusses the consequences of EMU for French economic policy. Although the external constraint vanishes, the public sector will still be subject to a solvency constraint. Monetary policy will be lost as an ins­trument. The absorption of asymmetric shocks will require more wage-price flexibility, but fiscal policy will also have an increased role to play.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean Pisani-Ferry & Claude Bismut, 1993. "L'union économique et monétaire : principes et implications," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(1), pages 121-142.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_hos_44_1_409429
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1993.409429
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1993.409429
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