IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs

  • Daniel Laskar

[fre] Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs On étudie le rôle sur la mise en place d'une union monétaire de deux types de disparités entre pays. L'une concerne la différence entre leurs tendances structurelles à générer de l'inflation ; l'autre est relative au degré d'asymétrie des chocs affectant leurs économies. Prenant en compte simultanément, dans un modèle à deux pays, les questions de coordination des politiques monétaires et celles liées à la crédibilité de celles-ci, on analyse comment se détermine le choix entre trois systèmes de change : un système de change flexible ; un système de change fixe asymétrique où le pays structurellement le moins inflationniste est le leader ; et enfin une union monétaire. Si la convergence structurelle des économies apparaît favorable à la création d'une union monétaire, le degré d'asymétrie des chocs s'avère avoir un effet ambigu pour différentes raisons qu'on est en mesure d'expliciter. [eng] Monetary union: structural differences and asymmetry of shocks We study the role that two types of disparities between countries may have on the creation of a monetary union. One concerns the difference between their structural tendencies to generale inflation ; the other is the degree of asymmetry of shocks which affect their economies. In a two country framework taking into account both the issue of coordination of monetary policies between countries and that of the credibility of these policies, we analyze the choice between three exchange rate Systems : a flexible exchange rate System ; an asymmetric exchange rate system where the leader is the country which is structurally less inflationary ; and, finally, a monetary union. Il the structural convergence of countries appears to be favorable to the creation of a monetary union, the degree of asymmetry of shocks, on the contrary, is shown to have an ambiguous effect for several reasons that we make explicit.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

File URL:
Download Restriction: Data and metadata provided by Persée are licensed under a Creative Commons "Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0" License

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 44 (1993)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 1045-1070

in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_6_409497
Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1993.409497
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Melitz, Jacques, 1985. "The welfare case for the European Monetary System," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 485-506, December.
  3. Tamim Bayoumi and Barry Eichengreen., 1992. "Is There a Conflict Between EC Enlargement and European Monetary Unification?," Economics Working Papers 92-188, University of California at Berkeley.
  4. Melitz, Jacques, 1988. "Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Synthesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Laskar, Daniel, 1986. "International cooperation and exchange rate stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 151-164, August.
  6. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June.
  7. Don E. Roper & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1980. "Optimal Exchange Market Intervention in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 296-309, May.
  8. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
  9. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
  10. repec:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:24 is not listed on IDEAS
  11. Laskar, Daniel, 1993. "The role of a fixed exchange rate system when central bankers are independent," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 319-331, June.
  12. Daniel Laskar, 1991. "Une union monétaire européenne pourrait-elle être moins inflationniste qu'une zone mark? un argument," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 24, pages 155-179.
  13. Boyer, Russell S, 1978. "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 1045-55, December.
  14. Laskar Daniel, 1987. "Conservative central bankers in a two-country world," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 8705, CEPREMAP.
  15. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-64, October.
  16. repec:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:24:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
  17. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_6_409497. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.