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Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs


  • Daniel Laskar


[fre] Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs. . On étudie le rôle sur la mise en place d'une union monétaire de deux types de disparités entre pays. L'une concerne la différence entre leurs tendances structurelles à générer de l'inflation ; l'autre est relative au degré d'asymétrie des chocs affectant leurs économies. Prenant en compte simultanément, dans un modèle à deux pays, les questions de coordination des politiques monétaires et celles liées à la crédibilité de celles-ci, on analyse comment se détermine le choix entre trois systèmes de change : un système de change flexible ; un système de change fixe asymétrique où le pays structurellement le moins inflationniste est le leader ; et enfin une union monétaire.. Si la convergence structurelle des économies apparaît favorable à la création d'une union monétaire, le degré d'asymétrie des chocs s'avère avoir un effet ambigu pour différentes raisons qu'on est en mesure d'expliciter. [eng] Monetary union: structural differences and asymmetry of shocks. . We study the role that two types of disparities between countries may have on the creation of a monetary union. One concerns the difference between their structural tendencies to generale inflation ; the other is the degree of asymmetry of shocks which affect their economies. In a two country framework taking into account both the issue of coordination of monetary policies between countries and that of the credibility of these policies, we analyze the choice between three exchange rate Systems : a flexible exchange rate System ; an asymmetric exchange rate system where the leader is the country which is structurally less inflationary ; and, finally, a monetary union.. Il the structural convergence of countries appears to be favorable to the creation of a monetary union, the degree of asymmetry of shocks, on the contrary, is shown to have an ambiguous effect for several reasons that we make explicit.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Laskar, 1993. "Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(6), pages 1045-1070.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1993_num_44_6_409497
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1993.409497

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Boyer, Russell S, 1978. "Optimal Foreign Exchange Market Intervention," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(6), pages 1045-1055, December.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    4. Melitz, Jacques, 1988. "Monetary Discipline and Cooperation in the European Monetary System: A Synthesis," CEPR Discussion Papers 219, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, 1992. "Is There a Conflict Between EC Enlargement and European Monetary Unification?," NBER Working Papers 3950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. repec:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:24 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
    8. Daniel Laskar, 1991. "Une union monétaire européenne pourrait-elle être moins inflationniste qu'une zone mark? un argument," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 24, pages 155-179.
    9. Don E. Roper & Stephen J. Turnovsky, 1980. "Optimal Exchange Market Intervention in a Simple Stochastic Macro Model," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 13(2), pages 296-309, May.
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    11. Melitz, Jacques, 1985. "The welfare case for the European Monetary System," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 485-506, December.
    12. Laskar, Daniel, 1986. "International cooperation and exchange rate stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 151-164, August.
    13. Laskar, Daniel, 1993. "The role of a fixed exchange rate system when central bankers are independent," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 319-331, June.
    14. Laskar, Daniel, 1989. "Conservative central bankers in a two-country world," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1575-1595, October.
    15. Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-564, October.
    17. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Daniel Laksar, 1994. "Choix d'un régime de change : le rôle des questions de crédibilité et d'interdépendance entre pays," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 515-528.

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