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Choix d'un régime de change : le rôle des questions de crédibilité et d'interdépendance entre pays

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  • Daniel Laksar

Abstract

[fre] Choix d'un régime de change. Le rôle des questions de crédibilité et d'interdépendance entre pays. . Ce texte étudie le rôle que la crédibilité et l'interdépendance entre pays des politiques monétaires ont sur le choix d'un régime de change. Il met plus particulièrement l'accent sur l'interaction entre ces deux aspects, celui de la crédibilité et celui de l'interdépendance. Il souligne également que lorsque, mis à part le régime de change, coexistent d'autres moyens, comme celui de déléguer la politique monétaire à une banque centrale indépendante, de résoudre ces deux problèmes, le choix et les caractéristiques du régime de change s'en trouvent modifiés. Il essaie enfin d'en tirer des conclusions sur l'évolution actuelle du Système monétaire européen et sur la question de l'Union monétaire européenne. [eng] Choice of an exchange rate regime : the role of issues of credibility and of interdependance between countries. . This paper studies the roles that the credibility and interdependence of monetary policies of countries have on the choice of an exchange rate regime. The interaction between these two parts of the problem, that of credibility and that of interdependence, is more particularly stressed. It is also underlined that when, beside the exchange rate regime, there exists other ways to solve these problems, as delegating monetary policy to an independant central bank, the features and the choice of an exchange rate regime are changed. Some tentative conclusions on the present evolution of the EMS and the issue of the European Monetary Union are also given.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniel Laksar, 1994. "Choix d'un régime de change : le rôle des questions de crédibilité et d'interdépendance entre pays," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 515-528.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1994_num_45_3_409543
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1994.409543
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1994.409543
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    3. Daniel Laskar, 1993. "Union monétaire : différences structurelles et asymétrie des chocs," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(6), pages 1045-1070.
    4. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
    5. Daniel Laskar, 1991. "Une union monétaire européenne pourrait-elle être moins inflationniste qu'une zone mark? un argument," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 24, pages 155-179.
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    7. Melitz, Jacques, 1985. "The welfare case for the European Monetary System," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 485-506, December.
    8. Laskar, Daniel, 1986. "International cooperation and exchange rate stabilization," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1-2), pages 151-164, August.
    9. Laskar, Daniel, 1993. "The role of a fixed exchange rate system when central bankers are independent," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 319-331, June.
    10. Laskar, Daniel, 1989. "Conservative central bankers in a two-country world," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(8), pages 1575-1595, October.
    11. Canzoneri, Matthew B & Gray, Jo Anna, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Consequences of Non-cooperative Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 26(3), pages 547-564, October.
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