IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/openec/v2y1991i2p113-136.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Masson
  • Jacques Melitz

Abstract

Do plans for a monetary union in Europe call for limits on the freedom of the country members of the union to use fiscal policy? In order to provide a tentative answer, we simulate the IMF model MULTIMOD, given various shocks, in the case of a European Monetary Union consisting only of France and Germany. The results clearly indicate the possible value of allowing unfettered use of fiscal policy in both countries. The reasons lie partly in differences in the initial position of the two, partly in differences in their preferences. We also examine the change in the policy significance of the current account in the monetary union. Current account imbalances clearly cease to have the same significance in a monetary union; but they do not therefore become irrelevant. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Masson & Jacques Melitz, 1991. "Fiscal policy independence in a European Monetary Union," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 113-136, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:2:y:1991:i:2:p:113-136
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01886896
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/BF01886896
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Dooley, Michael P. & Isard, Peter, 1991. "A note on fiscal policy, investment location decisions, and exchange rates," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 161-168, March.
    3. Cohen, Daniel & Wyplosz, Charles, 1989. "The European Monetary Union: An Agnostic Evaluation," CEPR Discussion Papers 306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein & Paul R. Masson, 1989. "International dimensions of monetary policy: coordination versus autonomy," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 183-243.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bohn, Frank, 2006. "Maastricht Criteria versus Stability Pact," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 247-276, April.
    2. R. Sean Craig, 1994. "Who will join EMU? Impact of the Maastricht convergence criteria on economic policy choice and performance," International Finance Discussion Papers 480, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    3. Bayoumi, Tamim & Masson, Paul R., 1995. "Fiscal flows in the United States and Canada: Lessons for monetary union in Europe," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 253-274, February.
    4. Frank Bohn, 2004. "Monetary Union and the Interest-Exchange Rate Trade-off," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 111-141, April.
    5. Jean Pisani-Ferry & Claude Bismut, 1993. "L'union économique et monétaire : principes et implications," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(1), pages 121-142.
    6. Michel Aglietta & Merih Uctum, 1995. "Fiscal consolidation in Europe," Research Paper 9519, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    7. Joseph Daniels & David VanHoose, 1998. "Two-Country Models of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: What Have We Learned? What More Can We Learn?," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 9(3), pages 265-284, July.
    8. Fabrice Capoen & Jérôme Creel, 2007. "Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case," Sciences Po publications N°2007-06, Sciences Po.
    9. Christodoulakis, Nicos & Garratt, Anthony & Currie, David, 1996. "Target zones and alternative proposals for G3 policy coordination: An empirical evaluation using GEM," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 49-68.
    10. Barry Eichengreen., 1992. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy After EMU," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C92-004, University of California at Berkeley.
    11. Charles Goodhart, 2006. "Replacing the Stability and Growth Pact?," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(3), pages 243-259, September.
    12. Jean Cordier & Pierre Jaillet & Dominique Plihon, 1993. "La conduite des politiques économiques et le policy-mix dans l'UEM," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 262(1), pages 37-48.
    13. Jensen, Svend Erik Hougaard & Jensen, Lars Grue, 1995. "Debt, deficits and transition to EMU: A small country analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 3-25, March.
    14. Andrew Atkeson & Tamim Bayoumi, 1993. "Do private capital markets insure regional risk? Evidence from the United States and Europe," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 303-324, September.
    15. Jacques Mélitz, 1991. "Brussels on a single money," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 323-336, October.
    16. Paul R. Masson & Mark P. Taylor, 1993. "Fiscal Policy within Common Currency Areas," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 29-44, March.
    17. Jacob A. Frenkel & Morris Goldstein, 1991. "The macroeconomic policy implications of trade and currency zones," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 157-235.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:openec:v:2:y:1991:i:2:p:113-136. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla) or (Rebekah McClure). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.