International monetary policy coordination under asymmetric shocks
The purpose of this paper is to show whether international policy coordination may be the best response to economic interdependence. We will study the short-run interactions taking pla ce among interdependent economies, where monetary supply is the instrument used to maintain output and price targets. We develop a macroeconomic model in which countries show different preferences regarding objectives and face asymmetric disturbances, analyzing in strategic terms how nonetary policy can deal with real, monetary, adn supply shocks. We also show how the superiority of the cooperative solution depends on the sources of the disturbances, the underlying economic frameword, and the asymmetry of the preferences.
|Date of creation:||2000|
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