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Régimes de change et coordination des politiques économiques en Europe

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  • Henri Sterdyniak
  • Pierre Villa

Abstract

[fre] Quel est le meilleur régime de change pour l'Europe ? Les changes flexibles induisent une forte instabilité des taux de change et comportent des risques d'inefficacité des politiques économiques du fait de leur non-coordination. Le SME permet à tous les pays européens de bénéficier de la crédibilité de la Bundesbank mais leur impose en contrepartie une politique monétaire dictée par la seule situation allemande et la stratégie de la Bundesbank. L 'UEM favorise l'intégration économique européenne mais les pays perdent toute indépendance monétaire et l'organisation des politiques budgétaires pose problème. L 'article présente les problèmes de méthodes que pose la comparaison des régimes de change (définition et fonctionnement, influence sur la dynamique des salaires, organisation et rôle des politiques monétaire et budgétaire). Il examine et discute les quelques études empiriques qui ont comparé la stabilité des économies européennes selon le régime de change. Enfin, une maquette fournit une illustration chiffrée des avantages et des défauts de chacun des régimes de change selon le type de choc qui frappe l'économie mondiale ; elle met en évidence les problèmes qu'ils posent quant à l'organisation et à la coopération des politiques économiques. Quand tous les pays européens sont frappés par un choc similaire, le SME ou I'UEM permettent de limiter les réactions erronées des politiques monétaires en Europe, mais cette coordination reste nettement moins efficace que ne le serait une coordination mondiale. En cas de choc spécifique à un pays, le SME et l'UEM peuvent devenir très inefficaces, en particulier pour les chocs spéculatifs ou pour les pays dominés (dans les deux cas) ; pour les chocs de balance commerciale (dans le cas du SME). L'utilisation des politiques budgétaires à des fins de stabilisation, de façon indépendante ou mieux de façon coordonnée, rend moins grave la perte de liberté qu'entraîne la fixité des changes.

Suggested Citation

  • Henri Sterdyniak & Pierre Villa, 1993. "Régimes de change et coordination des politiques économiques en Europe," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 43(1), pages 307-348.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1306
    DOI: 10.3406/ofce.1993.1306
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1993.1306
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Franck Amalric & Henri Sterdyniak, 1989. "Interdépendance et coopération : les leçons d'une maquette," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 26(1), pages 135-156.
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    3. Melitz, Jacques & Vori, Silvia, 1992. "National Insurance Against Unevenly Distributed Shocks in a European Monetary Union," CEPR Discussion Papers 697, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Var Der Ploeg, F., 1989. "Monetary Interdependence Under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regime," Papers 8920, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
    5. Currie, David & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "European monetary union or hard EMS?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1185-1204, August.
    6. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
    7. van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1989. "Monetary Interdependence under Alternative Exchange-Rate Regimes: A European Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 358, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    1. Jérôme Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 1998. "À propos de la volatilité de l'euro," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 65(1), pages 199-226.
    2. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/2963 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Jerome Creel & Henri Sterdyniak, 1998. "Discussing Euro Volatility," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 1998-03, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    4. Jean Pisani-Ferry & Claude Bismut, 1993. "L'union économique et monétaire : principes et implications," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 44(1), pages 121-142.
    5. Fabrice Capoen & Henri Sterdyniak & Pierre Villa, 1994. "Indépendance des banques centrales, politiques monétaire et budgétaire : une approche stratégique," Revue de l'OFCE, Programme National Persée, vol. 50(1), pages 65-102.
    6. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/5266 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Fabrice Capoen & Jérôme Creel, 2007. "Efficiency of stability-oriented institutions: the European case," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03461990, HAL.
    8. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5266 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Fayolle, J. & Micolet, P-E., 1998. "Cycles internationaux et européens: éléments pour une problématique appliquée," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 1998-01, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    10. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/2963 is not listed on IDEAS

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