Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of Competitive Arms Accumulation
This paper shows that the subgame-perfect Nash strategic equilibrium, which is relevant when countries can monitor their rival's weapon stock, leads to lower levels of arms and higher welfare than the standard open-loop Nash strategic equilibrium for an arms race. This result is derived for a model of competitive arms accumulation, in which two countries face a classic "guns versus butter" dilemma in the form of utilities that depend on consumption, leisure, and the characteristic defense. Moreover, it is argued that the perfect equilibrium strategies lead to a more satisfactory strategic underpinning of the well-know Richardson equations. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
Volume (Year): 31 (1990)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
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