IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

L'Union monétaire européenne : une revue de la littérature théorique

Listed author(s):
  • Andrew Brociner
Registered author(s):

    [eng] European Monetary Union: A Survey This survey considers the broad themes of European Monetary Union: optimal currency areas; a European Central Bank (ECB); and European fiscal policy. Each of these themes is the subject of controversy in the political arena as well as in the theoretical literature. The paper considers different criteria and empirical evidence which compare Europe to existing optimal currency areas. Europe qualifies on some but not all criteria. Another issue is the creation of the ECB. The gain in terms of credibility is not as transparent as for the EMS, because of the proposed structure of the ECB and of the relationship between the monetary and fiscal authorities. Finally, the issue of fiscal policy in Europe is examined. Different arguments both for and againstthe coordination of fiscal policy in Europe are presented, and the subject of fiscal federalism is discussed. Given the issues of national sovereignty and the size of the Community budget, it would be better to operate a reduced federal fiscal system, which would permit individual countries greater autonomy to offset asymmetric shocks. [fre] Cet article traite les grands thèmes de l'Union monétaire européenne : les zones monétaires optimales, la Banque centrale et la politique budgétaire européenne. Chacun de ces thèmes est sujet à controverse dans la littérature théorique. Peut-on, par exemple, caractériser l'Europe comme une zone monétaire optimale ? De plus, si les pays membres du Système monétaire européen ont pu bénéficier de gains de crédibilité, cela ne se reproduira pas nécessairement dans l'Union monétaire. Enfin, il y a de nombreux arguments à la fois pour et contre la coordination des politiques budgétaires en Europe.

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.3406/ofce.1993.1307
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://www.persee.fr/doc/ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1307
    Download Restriction: no

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Observations et diagnostics économiques : revue de l'OFCE.

    Volume (Year): 43 (1993)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 349-363

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1307
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1993.1307
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.persee.fr/collection/ofce

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as
    in new window


    1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    2. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "Is Europe an Optimum Currency Area?," CEPR Discussion Papers 478, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    4. Levine, Paul & Brociner, Andrew, 1994. "Fiscal policy coordination and EMU : A dynamic game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 699-729.
    5. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "Costs and Benefits of European Monetary Unification," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt2r11b5x1, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    6. Eichengreen, Barry, 1990. "One Money for Europe? Lessons from the US Currency Union," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt6ks1k831, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
    7. Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1991. "The welfare economics of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 215-244.
    8. Francesco Giavazzi & Marco Pagano, 1991. "The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and Central Bank Credibility," NBER Chapters,in: International Volatility and Economic Growth: The First Ten Years of The International Seminar on Macroeconomics, pages 303-330 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    9. Jurg Niehans, 1968. "Monetary and Fiscal Policies in Open Economies under Fixed Exchange Rates: An Optimizing Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 893-893.
    10. Currie, David & Levine, Paul & Pearlman, Joseph, 1992. "European monetary union or hard EMS?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 36(6), pages 1185-1204, August.
    11. Richard N. Cooper, 1969. "Macroeconomic Policy Adjustment in Interdependent Economies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 83(1), pages 1-24.
    12. A. Steven Englander & Thomas Egebo, 1992. "Adjustment under Fixed Exchange Rates: Application to the European Monetary Union," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 117, OECD Publishing.
    13. Buiter, W.H. & Kletzer, K.M., 1990. "Reflections On Fiscal Implications Of Common Currency," Papers 613, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
    14. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 199-217, May.
    15. Currie, David & Levine, Paul L & Vidalis, Nic, 1987. "International Cooperation and Reputation in an Empirical Two-Bloc Model," CEPR Discussion Papers 198, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    16. Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "Reflections on the Fiscal Implications of a Common Currency," CEPR Discussion Papers 418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    17. Cohen, Daniel, 1989. "Monetary and fiscal policy in an open economy with or without policy coordination," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 33(2-3), pages 303-309, March.
    18. Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1993_num_43_1_1307. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.