Fiscal Policy Coordination and EMU: A Dynamic Game Approach
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- Levine, Paul & Brociner, Andrew, 1994. "Fiscal policy coordination and EMU : A dynamic game approach," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 18(3-4), pages 699-729.
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KeywordsBarro-Ricardian Neutrality; EMU; Externality; Fiscal Policy Coordination; Reputation;
- F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration
- F36 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
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