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The régulation of the corporate welfare policy. Evidences from France

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  • Klebaner, Samuel

Abstract

The aim of this article is to demonstrate that the “Corporate Welfare” policies are embedded in a complex, dynamic and unstable mode of regulation. Based on qualitative and quantitative evidences from France since the 2008 financial crisis, we identify the five canonical institutional forms derived from the Régulation Theory that are coherent with industrial policies in favour of corporation without any counterparts. We consider that the deindustrialisation, the wage moderation, the fragmentation of national value chains is at the beginning of a race to the bottom of the public policy to compensate the profit loss. Behind the transfer of funds, we show that there is also a transfer of power to corporations, especially on the social welfare system. Finally, we will consider that this system is compatible as long as public debt creditors accepts to finance the difference between the quick transfers to corporations and the slow reduction of public expenditures, and second, that household have political and financial capacity to support this system.

Suggested Citation

  • Klebaner, Samuel, 2024. "The régulation of the corporate welfare policy. Evidences from France," MPRA Paper 121965, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:121965
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/121965/1/MPRA_paper_121965.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • L53 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Enterprise Policy

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