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Why does government produce national defense?


  • Randall Holcombe



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Suggested Citation

  • Randall Holcombe, 2008. "Why does government produce national defense?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 11-19, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:137:y:2008:i:1:p:11-19
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9313-y

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Martin C. McGuire & Mancur Olson Jr., 1996. "The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule: The Invisible Hand and the Use of Force," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 72-96, March.
    2. Meltzer, Allan H & Richard, Scott F, 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 914-927, October.
    3. Hochman, Harold M & Rodgers, James D, 1969. "Pareto Optimal Redistribution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 542-557, Part I Se.
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernhard Klingen, 2011. "A Public Choice Perspective on Defense and Alliance Policy," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 17 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Christopher Coyne, 2015. "Lobotomizing the defense brain," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 28(4), pages 371-396, December.
    3. Randall Holcombe, 2009. "A reformulation of the foundations of welfare economics," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(3), pages 209-224, September.
    4. Randall G. Holcombe, 2015. "Unanimous consent and constitutional economics," Chapters,in: Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 3, pages 35-53 Edward Elgar Publishing.

    More about this item


    Public goods; National defense; Market failure; Free riders; D7; H11; H21; H41;

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods


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