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Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights

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  • Leonid Polishchuk
  • Georgiy Syunyaev

Abstract

We provide a theory and empirical evidence indicating that the rotation of ruling elites in conjunction with elites’ asset ownership could improve property rights protection in non-democracies. The mechanism that upholds property rights is based on elites’ concern about the security of their own asset ownership in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Leonid Polishchuk & Georgiy Syunyaev, 2015. "Ruling elites’ rotation and asset ownership: implications for property rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(1), pages 159-182, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:162:y:2015:i:1:p:159-182
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-014-0210-2
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    2. Tkachenko, Andrey & Esaulov, Daniil, 2020. "Autocratic governors in public procurement," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    3. Koukal, Anna Maria & Schafer, Patricia & Eichenberger, Reiner, 2021. "Enfranchising non-citizens: What drives natives’ willingness to share power?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 1088-1108.
    4. Paniagua, Victoria & Vogler, Jan P., 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 110926, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Andrew T. Young, 2016. "What does it take for a roving bandit settle down? Theory and an illustrative history of the Visigoths," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 168(1), pages 75-102, July.
    6. Andrey Tkachenko & Daniil Esaulov, 2018. "The Role Of Governors In Public Procurement," HSE Working papers WP BRP 19/PSP/2018, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    7. Natkhov, T. & Polishchuk, L., 2017. "Political Economy of Institutions and Development: The Importance of Being Inclusive. Reflection on "Why Nations Fail" by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Part II. Institutional Change and Impli," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 12-32.
    8. Anna Maria Koukal & Reiner Eichenberger, 2017. "Explaining a Paradox of Democracy: The Role of Institutions in Female Enfranchisement," CREMA Working Paper Series 2017-13, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
    9. Andrew T. Young, 2015. "Visigothic Retinues: Roving Bandits that Succeeded Rome," Working Papers 15-09, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
    10. Natkhov, T. & Polishchuk, L., 2017. "Political Economy of Institutions and Development: The Importance of Being Inclusive. Reflection on "Why Nations Fail" by D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson. Part I. Institutions and Economic Devel," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 12-38.
    11. Usman Khalid, 2016. "Catch-up in Institutional Quality: An Empirical Assessment," Discussion Papers 2016-04, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
    12. Victoria Paniagua & Jan P. Vogler, 2022. "Economic elites and the constitutional design of sharing political power," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 25-52, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Endogenous property rights; Credible commitment; “Stationary bandit”; K11; O17; P14;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights

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