Sources of Corruption in Authoritarian Regimes
We seek to investigate the determinants of corruption in authoritarian polities. We hypothesize that corruption in nondemocratic settings will be greater where the ruling group is personalistic rather than a political party or a military clique and that it will be greater where rulers expect to remain in power longer. We construct a new operationalization of the selectorate theory advanced by Bueno de Mesquita et al. Copyright (c) 2010 by the Southwestern Social Science Association.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 91 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0038-4941|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0038-4941|