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The Resource Curse and its Potential Reversal

  • Boschini, Anne
  • Pettersson, Jan
  • Roine, Jesper

Several recent papers suggest that the negative association between natural resource intensity and economic growth can be reversed if institutional quality is high enough. We try to understand this result in more detail by decomposing the resource measure, using alternative measures of both resources and institutions, and by studying different time periods. While an institutional reversal is present in many specifications, only ores and metals interacted with the ICRG measure of institutional quality consistently have a negative growth effect but a positive interaction that turns the curse around when institutions are good enough.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal World Development.

Volume (Year): 43 (2013)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 19-41

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Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:43:y:2013:i:c:p:19-41
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

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