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Constitutions and the resource curse

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  • Jørgen Juel Andersen

    () (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Silje Aslaksen

    () (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

Recent advances in the political economy literature suggests that constitutional arrangements determine a wide range of economic pol icy outcomes. In particular, it is argued that different forms of government (presidential versus parliamentary) induce more or less 'growth promoting' policies. However, effects on long run growth have proved harder to identify. We exploit the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed to identify differences in the long-term performance of economies with different constitutional forms. Existing theory suggests that the presence of vast natural resources should affect growth differently in countries with different constitutional designs. Empirically we find strong support for this hypothesis - constitutions indeed seem to matter for how natural resource abundance affects long run growth. In fact, the form of government matters more than democratic rule. We also find interaction effects of electoral rules (majority versus proportional voting) and resource abundance on growth, although these effects are less clear-cut and less robust.

Suggested Citation

  • Jørgen Juel Andersen & Silje Aslaksen, 2006. "Constitutions and the resource curse," Working Paper Series 7506, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
  • Handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:7506
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Growth; Political economy; Constitution; Resource curse; Institutions.;

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F43 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - Economic Growth of Open Economies
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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