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Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data

Author

Listed:
  • Anton Kolotilin

    (UNSW - University of New South Wales [Sydney])

  • Sergei Guriev

  • Konstantin Sonin

    (State University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

In this article, we study nationalizations in the oil industry around the world during 1960–2006. We show, both theoretically and empirically, that governments are more likely to nationalize when oil prices are high and when political institutions are weak. We consider a simple dynamic model of the interaction between a government and a foreign-owned oil company. Even though nationalization is inefficient, it does occur in equilibrium when oil prices are high. The model's predictions are consistent with the analysis of panel data on nationalizations in the oil industry around the world since 1960. Nationalization is more likely to happen when oil prices are high and the quality of institutions is low, even controlling for country fixed effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Anton Kolotilin & Sergei Guriev & Konstantin Sonin, 2011. "Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," Post-Print hal-03415478, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03415478
    DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewp011
    as

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    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprise and Nonprofit Institutions; Privatization; Contracting Out
    • L71 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Primary Products and Construction - - - Mining, Extraction, and Refining: Hydrocarbon Fuels
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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