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Ruling elites' rotation and asset ownership: Implications for property rights

  • Leonid Polishchuk


    (Department of Economics and Laboratory for Applied Analysis of Institutions and Social Capital, NRU Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia))

  • Georgiy Syunyaev


    (Department of Economics and Laboratory for Applied Analysis of Institutions and Social Capital, NRU Higher School of Economics)

We provide a theory and empirical evidence showing that the rotation of ruling elites in combination with elites' asset ownership could improve property rights protection, and that such association holds for non-democratic political regimes when it is based on elites' concerns about security of their own property rights in the event they lose power. Such incentives provide a solution to the credible commitment problem in maintaining secure property rights when institutional restrictions on expropriation are weak or absent.

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Paper provided by National Research University Higher School of Economics in its series HSE Working papers with number WP BRP 43/EC/2013.

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Length: 36 pages
Date of creation: 2013
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in WP BRP Series: Economics / EC, December 2013, pages 1-36
Handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:43/ec/2013
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