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Add and rule

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  • Mehlum, Halvor
  • Moene, Karl Ove
  • Østenstad, Gry

Abstract

We suggest a new mechanism to explain political and economic inequality in resource rich countries. The mechanism is based on the premise that migrants are treated less generously in autocracies than in democracies. As a consequence, democracies want fewer migrants than autocracies. After democratization a new government may therefore start out with (potentially many) more migrants than their preferred level. These excess migrants, inherited from the autocracy, represent a costly legacy that makes democracy less attractive to citizens. With democracy less attractive, it is cheaper to compensate citizens for not challenging the autocratic regime. Not only that — by adding even more migrants, democratization becomes even less attractive, enabling the ruler to keep even more of the resource rents for himself without a threat of losing power.

Suggested Citation

  • Mehlum, Halvor & Moene, Karl Ove & Østenstad, Gry, 2025. "Add and rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:229:y:2025:i:c:s0167268124004669
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106852
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