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Les fondements microéconomiques de la valeur actionnariale. Une revue critique de la littérature

  • Antoine Rebérioux

Debates on corporate governance have promoted Shareholder value as the leading model. Yet the microeconomics and normative foundations of this model are generally not clearly stated. This article offers a critical survey of the approaches that, in relying on the theories of the firm as an incentive system, raise the question of the distribution of power into corporations. The Positive agency theory, the Modern property rights approach and the Neo-insitutionnal theory of the firm are reviewed. We show that as contractual incompletness is emphasised, conclusions tend to move away from Shareholder value.

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Article provided by Presses de Sciences-Po in its journal Revue économique.

Volume (Year): 56 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 51-75

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Handle: RePEc:cai:recosp:reco_561_0051
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