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External Mechanisms of Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • Radygin Alexandr

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Entov Revold

    (Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy)

  • Mejeraoups I.

Abstract

The aim of this research paper is to analyze those external corporate governance mechanisms, which either play a practical role or give an idea about the specifics of the Russian model. In the context of general institutional issues first of all market mechanisms are analyzed, which are “in built” into a modern system of corporate governance: financial arkets, corporate control market, bankruptcies. For the 2000’s, issues of improvement of the norms of voluntary regulation of corporate governance and harmonization of corporate legislation take special importance. That is why, considerable part of the research is dedicated to the novations of international regulation of corporate governance standards.

Suggested Citation

  • Radygin Alexandr & Entov Revold & Mejeraoups I., 2007. "External Mechanisms of Corporate Governance," Research Paper Series, Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy, issue 104P.
  • Handle: RePEc:gai:rpaper:102
    as

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    File URL: http://www.iep.ru/files/RePEc/gai/rpaper/102Radygin.pdf
    File Function: Revised version, 2012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate Governance; Mechanism;

    JEL classification:

    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • P27 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects
    • P31 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions

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