Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?
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- Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 414-418, May.
- Shleifer, Andrei, 2004. "Does Competition Destroy Ethical Behavior?," Scholarly Articles 27867243, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition
- L31 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Nonprofit Institutions; NGOs; Social Entrepreneurship
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2004-02-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HPE-2004-02-01 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-LAM-2004-02-01 (Central & South America)
- NEP-MIC-2004-02-01 (Microeconomics)
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