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Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent

  • Bernard Grofman

    ()

  • Thomas Brunell

    ()

  • Scott Feld

    ()

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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-011-9859-y
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

    Volume (Year): 152 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 147-161

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    Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:152:y:2012:i:1:p:147-161
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-011-9859-y
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/public+finance/journal/11127/PS2

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    1. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    2. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "Majority rule outcomes and the structure of debate in one-issue-at-a-time decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 239-252, December.
    3. Thomas E. Borcherding, 2002. "The Contributions of James M.Buchanan to Public Finance and Political Economy," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 30(6), pages 646-666, November.
    4. Mathew McCubbins & Terry Sullivan, 1984. "Constituency influences on legislative policy choice," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 299-319, August.
    5. Roger B. Myerson & Daniel Diermeier, 1999. "Bicameralism and Its Consequences for the Internal Organization of Legislatures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1182-1196, December.
    6. Kramer, Gerald H., 1977. "A dynamical model of political equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 310-334, December.
    7. Br Uninger, Thomas, 2003. "When Simple Voting Doesn t Work: Multicameral Systems for the Representation and Aggregation of Interests in International Organizations," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 681-703, October.
    8. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135.
    9. McKelvey, Richard D, 1979. "General Conditions for Global Intransitivities in Formal Voting Models," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(5), pages 1085-1112, September.
    10. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    11. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-36, May.
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