Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis
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More about this item
KeywordsPareto optimality; k-majority rule; Spatial voting; D7; C61;
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
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