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Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance

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  • Peter J. Boettke

    (George Mason University)

  • Henry A. Thompson

    (George Mason University)

Abstract

The growing preoccupation with identity within public discourse raises important questions concerning its effects on democratic governance. Building on the work of James M. Buchanan, we hope to show that (1) the logic of identity politics raises costs to political cooperation, (2) the phenomenon of identity politics flows from the larger rents associated with the identity group formation and (3) that the rent race has deleterious consequences, i.e., the subversion of democratic governance. The incentives of coalitions to define themselves along identity-related lines threatens democratic governance by enabling the formation of permanent winning coalitions. Without the ability to move between groups and take part in democratic governance, individuals who compose the permanent losing coalitions may choose to defect entirely, immersing the system in tribal violence.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter J. Boettke & Henry A. Thompson, 2022. "Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 483-499, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:191:y:2022:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-019-00683-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-019-00683-7
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    2. Daniel J. Smith, 2020. "Turn-taking in office," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 205-226, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Permanent winning coalitions; Artifactual man; Democracy; Identity economics; Identity politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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