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Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics

  • Berggren, Niclas

    ()

    (The Ratio Institute)

This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, would offer a useful extension of the research program.

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File URL: http://ratio.se/app/uploads/2014/11/nb_behavioral_166.pdf
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Paper provided by The Ratio Institute in its series Ratio Working Papers with number 166.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 19 May 2011
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming as Berggren, Niclas, 'Time for behavioral political economy? An analysis of articles in behavioral economics' in Review of Austrian Economics, 2011.
Handle: RePEc:hhs:ratioi:0166
Contact details of provider: Postal: The Ratio Institute, P.O. Box 5095, SE-102 42 Stockholm, Sweden
Phone: 08-441 59 00
Fax: 08-441 59 29
Web page: http://www.ratio.se/
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  1. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Game Theory and Information 9902003, EconWPA.
    • Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Papers 206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
    • Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
  2. Stefano DellaVigna, 2009. "Psychology and Economics: Evidence from the Field," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(2), pages 315-72, June.
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  7. Glaeser, Edward L., 2006. "Paternalism and Psychology," Working Paper Series rwp06-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
  8. Meglena Jeleva & Stephane Rossignol, 2009. "Political decision of risk reduction: the role of trust," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 83-104, April.
  9. Eliaz, Kfir & Spiegler, Ran, 2004. "Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents," CEPR Discussion Papers 4573, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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  11. Berg, Nathan & Gigerenzer, Gerd, 2010. "As-if behavioral economics: Neoclassical economics in disguise?," MPRA Paper 26586, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Klein, Daniel B., 1994. "If Government is so Villainous, How come Government Officials don't seem like Villains?," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(01), pages 91-106, April.
  13. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Walrasian Economics In Retrospect," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1411-1439, November.
  14. Edward L. Glaeser, 2004. "Psychology and the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 408-413, May.
  15. Pantelis Kalaitzidakis & Theofanis P. Mamuneas & Thanasis Stengos, 2003. "Rankings of Academic Journals and Institutions in Economics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(6), pages 1346-1366, December.
  16. James M. Buchanan, 1949. "The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 57, pages 496.
  17. Levy, David M, 2002. " Robust Institutions," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 15(2-3), pages 131-42, June.
  18. Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, 2003. "Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 48(Jun).
  19. Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen, 2007. "Introduction to Behavioral Economics and Its Applications
    [Behavioral Economics and Its Applications]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  20. John List & Steven Levitt, 2008. "Homo economicus evolves," Artefactual Field Experiments 00095, The Field Experiments Website.
  21. Hillman, Arye L., 2010. "Expressive behavior in economics and politics," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 403-418, December.
  22. Stefan Voigt, 2006. "Robust political economy: The case of antitrust," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 203-215, June.
  23. Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 2005. "Uncertainty and Hyperbolic Discounting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1290-1299, September.
  24. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2004. "Addiction and Cue-Triggered Decision Processes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1558-1590, December.
  25. Scott Beaulier & J. Subrick, 2006. "Poverty traps and the robust political economy of development assistance," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 217-226, June.
  26. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, 2003. "Libertarian Paternalism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(2), pages 175-179, May.
  27. Nava Ashraf & Colin F. Camerer & George Loewenstein, 2005. "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(3), pages 131-145, Summer.
  28. Daniel Kahneman, 2003. "Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1449-1475, December.
  29. John Ameriks & Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, 2002. "Wealth Accumulation and the Propensity to Plan," NBER Working Papers 8920, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. repec:feb:framed:0077 is not listed on IDEAS
  31. Peter Leeson & J. Subrick, 2006. "Robust political economy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 107-111, June.
  32. Richard N. Langlois, 1985. "Knowledge and Rationality in the Austrian School: An Analytical Survey," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 309-330, Oct-Dec.
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