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30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political philosophy

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  • Michael C. Munger

    (Duke University)

Abstract

There are three main foundations of Public Choice theory: methodological individualism, behavioral symmetry, and “politics as exchange.” The first two are represented in nearly all work that identifies as “Public Choice,” but politics as exchange is often forgotten or de-emphasized. This paper—adapted from a lecture given on the occasion of the 30th year after Buchanan’s Nobel Prize—fleshes out Buchanan’s theory of politics as exchange, using four notions that are uniquely central to his thought: philosophical anarchism, ethical neutrality, subjectivism, and the “relatively absolute absolutes.” A central tension in Buchanan’s work is identified, in which he seems simultaneously to argue both that nearly anything agreed to by a group could be enforced within the group as a contract, and that there are certain types of rules and arrangements, generated by decentralized processes, that serve human needs better than state action. It is argued that it is a mistake to try to reconcile this tension, and that both parts of the argument are important.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael C. Munger, 2018. "30 years after the nobel: James Buchanan’s political philosophy," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(2), pages 151-167, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revaec:v:31:y:2018:i:2:d:10.1007_s11138-018-0418-3
    DOI: 10.1007/s11138-018-0418-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Brennan,Geoffrey & Lomasky,Loren (ed.), 1997. "Democracy and Decision," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521585248, December.
    2. James Buchanan, 1990. "The domain of constitutional economics," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 1-18, December.
    3. Kliemt, Hartmut, 2011. "Bukantianism—Buchanan's philosophical economics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 275-279.
    4. Knut Wicksell, 1958. "A New Principle of Just Taxation," International Economic Association Series, in: Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock (ed.), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, pages 72-118, Palgrave Macmillan.
    5. Geoffrey Brennan, 2015. "Buchanan’s anti-conservatism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 163(1), pages 7-13, April.
    6. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, December.
    7. Hartmut Kliemt, 2004. "Contractarianism as Liberal Conservatism: Buchanan's Unfinished Philosophical Agenda," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 171-185, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter J. Boettke & M. Scott King, 2023. "James M. Buchanan on “the relatively absolute absolutes” and “truth judgments” in politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 213-230, June.
    2. Vincent Carret, 2022. "Jacques Rueff, Friedrich Hayek, and the Emergence of Economic Order: the Case of the European Coal and Steel Community," Working Papers halshs-03824688, HAL.
    3. Peter J. Boettke & Henry A. Thompson, 2022. "Identity and off-diagonals: how permanent winning coalitions destroy democratic governance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(3), pages 483-499, June.
    4. Michael Munger & Cameron Tilley, 2023. "Race, risk, and greed: Harold Black's contributions to the institutional economics of finance," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(3), pages 335-346, December.
    5. Art Carden & M. Scott King & Audrey Redford & James E. Hanley, 2021. "James M. Buchanan’s Constrained Vision in Cost and Choice ," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 36(Fall 2021), pages 91-109.
    6. Michael Munger & Georg Vanberg, 2023. "Contractarianism, constitutionalism, and the status quo," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 323-339, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    James Buchanan; Public choice; Subjectivism; Methodological individualism; Institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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