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Michael Munger

Personal Details

First Name:Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name:Munger
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pmu54
http://www.duke.edu/~munger
Department of Political Science Box 90204 Duke University Durham, NC 27708-0204
919 660 4300

Affiliation

Sanford School of Public Policy
Duke University

Durham, North Carolina (United States)
http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/

:

PO Box 90239, Durham, NC 27708-0239
RePEc:edi:sidukus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Articles

Articles

  1. Michael Munger, 2009. "Donald G. Saari, Disposing Dictators, Demystifying Voting Paradoxes: Social Choice Analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 539-542, September.
  2. Michael Munger, 2009. "The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(2), pages 169-175, June.
  3. Michael Munger, 2008. "Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 507-522, December.
  4. Michael Munger, 2008. "Thinking about order without thought: the lifetime contributions of Gordon Tullock," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 135(1), pages 79-88, April.
  5. Michael Munger, 2008. "New publications," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 495-500, March.
  6. Michael Munger, 2008. "Blogging and political information: truth or truthiness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 125-138, January.
  7. Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger, 2007. "Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 231-246, July.
  8. Michael Munger, 2007. "Neoliberalism: National and Regional Experiments with Global Ideas," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 503-504, September.
  9. Michael Munger, 2007. "Book Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 251-254, July.
  10. William Shughart & Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard & Michael Munger, 2007. "Editorial announcement," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(3), pages 255-256, September.
  11. Melvin Hinich & Michael Munger, 2006. "In memoriam: Otto “Toby” Davis, 1934–2006," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 357-359, September.
  12. Michael Munger, 2006. "Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 485-489, June.
  13. Michael Munger, 2006. "A Life Reexamined," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 499-500, September.
  14. Michael Munger, 2006. "Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 131-146, July.
  15. Jennifer Merolla & Michael Munger & Michael Tofias, 2005. "In Play: A Commentary on Strategies in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 19-37, April.
  16. Michael Munger, 2005. "Nineteenth-century voting procedures in a twenty-first century world," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 115-133, July.
  17. Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee & Michael C. Munger, 2004. "Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(2), pages 213-240.
  18. Michael C. Munger, 2004. "Economists and Fiscal Policy Advice: A Deficit or a Deficiency?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 235-249, March.
  19. Munger Michael C., 2004. "Munger's Comment on Ostrom and Ostrom," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 149-160, January.
  20. Potthoff, Richard F & Munger, Michael C, 2003. "Use of Integer Programming to Optimize the Scheduling of Panels at Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 163-175, October.
  21. Cooper, Alexandra & Munger, Michael C, 2000. "The (Un)Predictability of Primaries with Many Candidates: Simulation Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 337-355, June.
  22. Munger, Michael C, 2000. "Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda for Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 1-12, April.
  23. Hinich, Melvin J & Munger, Michael C, 1998. "Empirical Studies in Comparative Politics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 219-227, December.
  24. Hinich, Melvin J & Munger, Michael C & de Marchi, Scott, 1998. "Ideology and the Construction of Nationality: The Canadian Elections of 1993," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 401-428, December.
  25. Morris, Irwin & Munger, Michael, 1998. "First Branch, or Root? The Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(3-4), pages 363-380, September.
  26. Munger, Michael & Schaller, Thomas, 1997. "The Prohibition-Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment in Interest Group Influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 139-163, March.
  27. Coates, Dennis & Munger, Michael C, 1995. "Win, Lose, or Withdraw: A Categorical Analysis of Career Patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948-1978," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 95-111, April.
  28. Coates, Dennis & Munger, Michael C, 1995. "Strategizing in Small Group Decision-Making: Host State Identification for Radioactive Waste Disposal among Eight Southern States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 1-15, January.
  29. Collier, Kenneth & Munger, Michael, 1994. "A Comparison of Incumbent Security in the House and Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 145-154, February.
  30. Enelow, James M & Munger, Michael C, 1993. "The Elements of Candidate Reputation: The Effect of Record and Credibility on Optimal Spatial Location," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 757-772, December.
  31. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.
  32. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C & Torrent, Gary M, 1990. "Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 111-128, November.
  33. Richardson, Lilliard E, Jr & Munger, Michael C, 1990. "Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 11-33, October.
  34. Dougan, William R & Munger, Michael C, 1989. "The Rationality of Ideology," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-142, April.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Articles

  1. Michael Munger, 2009. "The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(2), pages 169-175, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Fabio Padovano, 2013. "Are we witnessing a paradigm shift in the analysis of political competition?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 631-651, September.

  2. Michael Munger, 2008. "Economic choice, political decision, and the problem of limits," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(3), pages 507-522, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Bjørnskov, Christian, 2016. "Economic freedom and economic crises," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(S), pages 11-23.
    2. Rasmus Thönnessen & Erich Gundlach, 2013. "The size of human capital externalities: cross-country evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 671-689, December.
    3. Niklas Potrafke, 2010. "Labor market deregulation and globalization: empirical evidence from OECD countries," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 146(3), pages 545-571, September.
    4. Potrafke, Niklas, 2010. "Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries," Munich Reprints in Economics 19284, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    5. Chang, Chun Ping & Berdiev, Aziz N., 2011. "The political economy of energy regulation in OECD countries," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 816-825, September.
    6. Facchini, François & Melki, Mickaël, 2013. "Efficient government size: France in the 20th century," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 1-14.
    7. François Facchini & Mickaël Melki, 2011. "Optimal government size and economic growth in France (1871-2008) : An explanation by the State and market failures," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00654363, HAL.
    8. Christian Bjørnskov, 2014. "Do Economic Reforms Alleviate Subjective Well-Being Losses of Economic Crises?," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 163-182, February.

  3. Michael Munger, 2008. "Blogging and political information: truth or truthiness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(1), pages 125-138, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Jimmy Chan & Daniel Stone, 2013. "Media proliferation and partisan selective exposure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(3), pages 467-490, September.

  4. Michael Ensley & Scott Marchi & Michael Munger, 2007. "Candidate uncertainty, mental models, and complexity: Some experimental results," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 231-246, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Darren Grant & Michael Toma, 2008. "Elemental tests of the traditional rational voting model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 173-195, October.

  5. Michael Munger, 2007. "Book Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 251-254, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Wolfgang Mayer & Jun Li, 1994. "Interest Groups, Electoral Competition, And Probabilistic Voting For Trade Policies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 6(1), pages 59-77, March.

  6. Michael Munger, 2006. "Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 131-146, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Sean Mulholland, 2013. "White supremacist groups and hate crime," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 91-113, October.
    2. James Kostelnik & David Skarbek, 2013. "The governance institutions of a drug trafficking organization," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 95-103, July.
    3. Skarbek, David, 2012. "Prison gangs, norms, and organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 96-109.
    4. Jason Briggeman, 2009. "Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 481-491, December.
    5. Charles Rowley & Nathanael Smith, 2009. "Islam’s democracy paradox: Muslims claim to like democracy, so why do they have so little?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 273-299, June.

  7. Jennifer Merolla & Michael Munger & Michael Tofias, 2005. "In Play: A Commentary on Strategies in the 2004 U.S. Presidential Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 19-37, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Scott Macdonell & Nick Mastronardi, 2015. "Waging simple wars: a complete characterization of two-battlefield Blotto equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 183-216, January.
    2. Vermeulen A.J. & Schröder M.J.W. & Peters H.J.M., 2013. "Claim games for estate division problems," Research Memorandum 055, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).

  8. Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee & Michael C. Munger, 2004. "Move to markets? An empirical analysis of privatization in developing countries," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(2), pages 213-240.

    Cited by:

    1. Olsson, Jerry, 2006. "Decentralization of Governance and Financing of Public Roads in the Philippines in the 1990s," Philippine Journal of Development PJD 2004 Vol. XXXI No. 2-, Philippine Institute for Development Studies.
    2. Samuel Adams, 2011. "Privatization and National Development: A Case Study of Ghana," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 11(3), pages 237-253, September.
    3. Julian Lampietti, 2004. "Power's Promise : Electricity Reforms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 14936.
    4. Samuel Adams & Berhanu Mengistu, 2008. "The Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 89(1), pages 78-94.
    5. D'Souza, Juliet & Nash, Robert, 2017. "Private benefits of public control: Evidence of political and economic benefits of state ownership," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 46(C), pages 232-247.
    6. Shengbao Ji & Yin-Fang Zhang & Tooraj Jamasb, 2014. "Reform of the Coal Sector in an Open Economy: The Case of China," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1445, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    7. Adams, Samuel & Klobodu, Edem Kwame Mensah & Opoku, Eric Evans Osei, 2016. "Energy consumption, political regime and economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 36-44.
    8. Vatcharin Sirimaneetham, 2006. "What drives liberal policies in developing countries?," Bristol Economics Discussion Papers 06/587, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK.
    9. Boubakri, Narjess & Cosset, Jean-Claude & Guedhami, Omrane & Saffar, Walid, 2011. "The political economy of residual state ownership in privatized firms: Evidence from emerging markets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 244-258, April.
    10. Witold J. Henisz & Bennet A. Zelner & Mauro F. Guillen, 2004. "International Coercion, Emulation and Policy Diffusion: Market-Oriented Infrastructure Reforms, 1977-1999," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2004-713, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.

  9. Michael C. Munger, 2004. "Economists and Fiscal Policy Advice: A Deficit or a Deficiency?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 235-249, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Francesco Forte & Cosimo Magazzino, 2013. "Twin Deficits in the European Countries," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 19(3), pages 289-310, August.

  10. Potthoff, Richard F & Munger, Michael C, 2003. "Use of Integer Programming to Optimize the Scheduling of Panels at Annual Meetings of the Public Choice Society," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 163-175, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Akkan, Can & Erdem Külünk, M. & Koçaş, Cenk, 2016. "Finding robust timetables for project presentations of student teams," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(2), pages 560-576.

  11. Cooper, Alexandra & Munger, Michael C, 2000. "The (Un)Predictability of Primaries with Many Candidates: Simulation Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 337-355, June.

    Cited by:

    1. Lawrence Kenny & Babak Lotfinia, 2005. "Evidence on the importance of spatial voting models in presidential nominations and elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 439-462, June.
    2. Arianna Degan, 2003. "A Dynamic Model of Voting," PIER Working Paper Archive 04-015, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 May 2004.

  12. Munger, Michael C, 2000. "Five Questions: An Integrated Research Agenda for Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(1-2), pages 1-12, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Michael Munger, 2010. "Endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful: Elinor Ostrom and the diversity of institutions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(3), pages 263-268, June.
    2. Dijkstra, Bouwe R., 2007. "Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 91-110, September.
    3. Michael Munger, 2006. "Preference modification vs. incentive manipulation as tools of terrorist recruitment: The role of culture," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 131-146, July.

  13. Hinich, Melvin J & Munger, Michael C & de Marchi, Scott, 1998. "Ideology and the Construction of Nationality: The Canadian Elections of 1993," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 401-428, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Bjørnskov & Niklas Potrafke, 2009. "Political ideology and economic freedom across Canadian provinces," Working Papers CEB 09-054.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.

  14. Munger, Michael & Schaller, Thomas, 1997. "The Prohibition-Repeal Amendments: A Natural Experiment in Interest Group Influence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 139-163, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Koleman S. Strumpf & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, 2002. "Endogenous Policy Decentralization: Testing the Central Tenet of Economic Federalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(1), pages 1-36, February.
    2. John Dinan & Jac C. Heckelman, 2014. "Support for Repealing Prohibition: An Analysis of State-Wide Referenda on Ratifying the 21st Amendment," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 95(3), pages 636-651, September.
    3. William Keech & Michael Munger, 2015. "The anatomy of government failure," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 1-42, July.
    4. Dostie, Benoit & Dupré, Ruth, 2012. "“The people's will”: Canadians and the 1898 referendum on alcohol prohibition," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 498-515.
    5. Thomas Schaller, 1997. "Consent for Change: Article V and The Constitutional Amendment Process," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 8(3), pages 195-213, September.

  15. Coates, Dennis & Munger, Michael C, 1995. "Win, Lose, or Withdraw: A Categorical Analysis of Career Patterns in the House of Representatives, 1948-1978," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 83(1-2), pages 95-111, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Carsey & William Berry, 2014. "What’s a losing party to do? The calculus of contesting state legislative elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 160(1), pages 251-273, July.

  16. Coates, Dennis & Munger, Michael C, 1995. "Strategizing in Small Group Decision-Making: Host State Identification for Radioactive Waste Disposal among Eight Southern States," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 82(1-2), pages 1-15, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1997. "Rethinking Federalism," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 43-64, Fall.
    2. Edward J. Lopez & R. Todd Jewell, 2005. "Strategic Institutional Choice: Voters, States, and Congressional Term Limits," Public Economics 0512006, EconWPA.
    3. Wilson, Matthew A. & Howarth, Richard B., 2002. "Discourse-based valuation of ecosystem services: establishing fair outcomes through group deliberation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 431-443, June.
    4. Yoshio Iida & Christiane Schwieren, 2016. "Contributing for Myself, but Free riding for My Group?," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(1), pages 36-47, February.

  17. Enelow, James M & Munger, Michael C, 1993. "The Elements of Candidate Reputation: The Effect of Record and Credibility on Optimal Spatial Location," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(4), pages 757-772, December.

    Cited by:

    1. Michael Ensley, 2012. "Incumbent positioning, ideological heterogeneity and mobilization in U.S. House elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 43-61, April.
    2. Stephanie Hoopes, 2001. "The Credibility Factor in Elections: Evidence from Britain's Nationwide Building Society's Vote Against Conversion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 107(1), pages 115-133, April.
    3. Narwa, Daniel, 2001. "How general should the proximity model be?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 53-74, March.
    4. DeBacker, Jason, 2008. "Flip-Flopping: Ideological Adjustment Costs in the United States Senate," MPRA Paper 8735, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Bräuer, Wolfgang, 1998. "Electoral Competition under Media Influence," ZEW Discussion Papers 98-19, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    6. Claudio Bonilla, 2004. "A Model of Political Competition in the Underlying Space of Ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 51-67, October.

  18. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C, 1991. "Committee Assignments, Constituent Preferences, and Campaign Contributions," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 29(1), pages 24-43, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Ferguson, Thomas & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2005. "Betting on Hitler - The Value of Political Connections in Nazi Germany," CEPR Discussion Papers 5021, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Stratmann, Thomas, 2002. "Can Special Interests Buy Congressional Votes? Evidence from Financial Services Legislation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 45(2), pages 345-373, October.
    3. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Dana L. Hoag & Thomas G. Field, 1999. "Political and Economic Factors Affecting Agricultural PAC Contribution Strategies," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 81(2), pages 397-407.
    5. Brian Robert Calfano, 2010. "Prophetic at Any Price? Clergy Political Behavior and Utility Maximization," Social Science Quarterly, Southwestern Social Science Association, vol. 91(3), pages 649-668.
    6. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 2005. "Corporate Campaign Contributions, Repeat Giving, and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 41-71, April.
    7. Riddel, Mary, 2003. "Candidate eco-labeling and senate campaign contributions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 177-194, March.
    8. Tim Wegenast, 2010. "Uninformed Voters for Sale: Electoral Competition, Information and Interest Groups in the US," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(2), pages 271-300, May.
    9. Ansolabehere, Stephen & De Figueiredo, John M. & Snyder, James M., 2003. "Are Campaign Contributions Investment in the Political Marketplace or Individual Consumption? Or "Why Is There So Little Money in Politics?"," Working papers 4272-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
    10. Peter Calcagno & John Jackson, 2008. "PAC Spending and Roll Call Voting in the U.S. House: An Empirical Extension," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(25), pages 1-11.
    11. Joseph McGarrity, 2006. "The committee assignment process as an optimal contracting problem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 433-455, September.
    12. Michael Ensley, 2009. "Individual campaign contributions and candidate ideology," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 221-238, January.
    13. Bombardini, Matilde & Trebbi, Francesco, 2011. "Votes or money? Theory and evidence from the US Congress," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 587-611.
    14. Atif Mian & Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, 2008. "The Political Economy of the U.S. Mortgage Default Crisis," NBER Working Papers 14468, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Craig A. Bond & Dana L. Hoag & Jennifer Freeborn, 2011. "Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation of Political Contributions from Agricultural Subsectors," American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(1), pages 210-237, January.
    16. Alexander Fink, 2017. "Donations to Political Parties: Investing Corporations and Consuming Individuals?," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(2), pages 220-255, May.
    17. Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2013. "Corporate campaign contributions and abnormal stock returns after presidential elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 285-307, July.
    18. Tahoun, Ahmed, 2014. "The role of stock ownership by US members of Congress on the market for political favors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 86-110.
    19. Stephen Ansolabehere & John M. de Figueiredo & James M. Snyder Jr, 2003. "Why is There so Little Money in U.S. Politics?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 105-130, Winter.
    20. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1999. "Does Political Ambiguity Pay? Corporate Campaign contributions and the Rewards to Legislator Reputation," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 155, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
    21. Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2008. "PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 407-419, December.
    22. James E. Anderson & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Political Market Structure," NBER Working Papers 8371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    23. Aggey Semenov & Hector Perez Saiz, 2014. "The Effect Of Campaign Contributions On State Banking Regulation And Bank Expansion In U.S," 2014 Meeting Papers 1265, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    24. Jay Dow & James Endersby & Charles Menifield, 1998. "The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 67-83, January.
    25. Tomaso Duso & Astrid Jung, 2002. "Market Conduct and Endogenous Lobbying: Evidence from the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry," CIG Working Papers FS IV 02-35, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
    26. José Cruz, 2001. "An empirical application of the median voter model and of the interest group influence model to the Portuguese and Galician municipalities," ERSA conference papers ersa01p25, European Regional Science Association.
    27. Bond, Craig A. & Hoag, Dana L. & Freeborn, Jennifer & Van Doren, Terry, 2008. "Are Agricultural PACs Monolithic? An Empirical Investigation," Working Papers 108718, Colorado State University, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    28. Joseph McGarrity, 2005. "Macroeconomic conditions and committee re-election rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 453-480, September.
    29. Ovtchinnikov, Alexei V. & Pantaleoni, Eva, 2012. "Individual political contributions and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 367-392.
    30. Thomas Stratmann & Francisco J. & Aparicio-Castillo, 2006. "Competition policy for elections: Do campaign contribution limits matter?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(1), pages 177-206, April.
    31. Ivan Pastine & Tuvana Pastine, 2010. "Politician preferences, law-abiding lobbyists and caps on political contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 145(1), pages 81-101, October.
    32. Dalton Conley & Brian J. McCabe, 2008. "Bribery or Just Desserts? Evidence on the Influence of Congressional Voting Patterns on PAC Contributions from Exogenous Variation in the Sex Mix of Legislator Offspring," NBER Working Papers 13945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    33. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July.
    34. Robert Florence, 1999. "An analysis of PAC contributions and legislator quality," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 59-73, March.
    35. Milyo, Jeffrey, 1997. "Electoral and Financial Effects of Changes in Committee Power: The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Reform, the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and the Money Committees in the House," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 93-111, April.
    36. Christopher Duquette & Franklin Mixon & Richard Cebula, 2013. "The Impact of Legislative Tenure and Seniority on General Election Success: Econometric Evidence from U.S. House Races," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(2), pages 161-172, June.
    37. Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "The Market for Congressional Votes: Is Timing of Contributions Everything?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(1), pages 85-113, April.
    38. Correia, Maria M., 2014. "Political connections and SEC enforcement," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 241-262.
    39. Glenn Parker & Suzanne Parker, 1998. "The economic organization of legislatures and how it affects congressional voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 95(1), pages 117-129, April.
    40. Stratmann, Thomas, 1996. "How Reelection Constituencies Matter: Evidence from Political Action Committees' Contributions and Congressional Voting," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(2), pages 603-635, October.
    41. Paul Calluzzo & G Nathan Dong & David Godsell, 2017. "Sovereign wealth fund investments and the US political process," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 48(2), pages 222-243, February.

  19. Grier, Kevin B & Munger, Michael C & Torrent, Gary M, 1990. "Allocation Patterns of PAC Monies: The U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 111-128, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Boadu, Frederick O. & Thompson, Marla R., 1993. "The Political Economy Of The U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement: Analysis Of The Congressional Fast Track Vote," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 25(02), December.
    3. Charles Cho & Dennis Patten & Robin Roberts, 2006. "Corporate Political Strategy: An Examination of the Relation between Political Expenditures, Environmental Performance, and Environmental Disclosure," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 67(2), pages 139-154, August.
    4. Randall Bennett & Christine Loucks, 2008. "PAC Contributions from Sectors of the Financial Services Industry, 1998–2002," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 36(4), pages 407-419, December.
    5. Jay Dow & James Endersby & Charles Menifield, 1998. "The industrial structure of the California Assembly: Committee assignments, economic interests, and campaign contributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(1), pages 67-83, January.
    6. Randall W. Bennett & Christine Loucks, 1996. "Politics And Length Of Time To Bank Failure: 1986-1990," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(4), pages 29-41, October.
    7. Robert Florence, 1999. "An analysis of PAC contributions and legislator quality," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 27(1), pages 59-73, March.

  20. Richardson, Lilliard E, Jr & Munger, Michael C, 1990. "Shirking, Representation, and Congressional Behavior: Voting on the 1983 Amendments to the Social Security Act," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 67(1), pages 11-33, October.

    Cited by:

    1. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Fredriksson, Per G. & Gaston, Noel, 1999. "The "greening" of trade unions and the demand for eco-taxes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 663-686, November.
    3. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.

  21. Dougan, William R & Munger, Michael C, 1989. "The Rationality of Ideology," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 119-142, April.

    Cited by:

    1. Ramirez Carlos D., 2011. "The $700 Billion Bailout: A Public-Choice Interpretation," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 291-318, November.
    2. Kevin Grier & Michael Munger, 1986. "The impact of legislator attributes on interest-group campaign contributions," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 7(4), pages 349-361, September.
    3. Dennis, Christopher & Bishin, Benjamin & Nicolaou, Politimy, 2000. "Constituent diversity and congress: the case of NAFTA," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 349-360, July.
    4. Potters, J.J.M. & Sloof, R., 1996. "Interest groups : A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence," Other publications TiSEM ff27d5d8-f584-4386-a1fc-5, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Michael Munger, 2009. "The principal difficulty: Besley’s neo-Rousseavian aspirations," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 22(2), pages 169-175, June.
    6. René Lindstädt & Ryan Wielen, 2011. "Timely shirking: time-dependent monitoring and its effects on legislative behavior in the U.S. Senate," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(1), pages 119-148, July.
    7. Berggren, Niclas, 2003. "The Frailty of Economic Reforms: Political Logic and Constitutional Lessons," Ratio Working Papers 1, The Ratio Institute.
    8. Shaun M. Tanger & Richard Alan Seals Jr. & David N. Laband, 2011. "Does Bill Co-sponsorship Affect Campaign Contributions?: Evidence from the U.S. House of Representatives, 2000-2008," Auburn Economics Working Paper Series auwp2011-09, Department of Economics, Auburn University.
    9. John Lott & W. Reed, 1989. "Shirking and sorting in a political market with finite-lived politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 75-96, April.
    10. Morong, Cyril, 1996. "Socio-economic elements in Public Choice research," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 559-569.
    11. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    12. Glenn Parker, 2005. "Reputational capital, opportunism, and self-policing in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 333-354, March.
    13. J. O’Roark & William Wood, 2011. "Determinants of congressional minimum wage support: the role of economic education," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 209-225, April.
    14. Benjamin Bishin & Jay Dow & James Adams, 2006. "Does democracy “suffer” from diversity? Issue representation and diversity in senate elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 129(1), pages 201-215, October.
    15. Beth Rosenson, 2007. "Explaining legislators’ positions on outside income limits: Voting on honoraria ceilings in the U.S. Senate, 1981–1983," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 133(1), pages 111-128, October.
    16. Dennis, Christopher & Medoff, Marshall H. & Magnera, Michael, 2008. "Constituents' economic interests and senator support for spending limitations," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2443-2453, December.
    17. John A. Ferejohn, 1991. "Changes in Welfare Policy in the 1980s," NBER Chapters,in: Politics and Economics in the Eighties, pages 123-142 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Tanger, Shaun M. & Laband, David N., 2009. "An empirical analysis of bill co-sponsorship in the U.S. Senate: The Tree Act of 2007," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(4), pages 260-265, July.
    19. Sutter, Daniel, 1999. "Discretionary policy implementation and reform," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 249-262, July.
    20. Glenn Parker & Matthew Dabros, 2012. "Last-period problems in legislatures," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 789-806, June.
    21. Jason DeBacker, 2012. "Political parties and political shirking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 651-670, March.

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