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Refocusing the EU Budget ? An Institutional View

  • Charles B. Blankart
  • Gerrit B. Koester

There is little disagreement that the EU budget should be refocused. Redistributive agricultural and structural spending should be reduced in favour of more public good spending as the Boege and Sapir reports demand. But a public choice analysis can show that the current deadlock makes a refocusing of the budget unlikely. Starting with the Treaty of Rome we demonstrate how Member States became net payers and receivers and why the underlying coalitions were fairly stable and will remain so after Lisbon. We propose an additional public good budget within an improved process of enhanced cooperation to overcome the deadlock.

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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA) in its series CREMA Working Paper Series with number 2009-16.

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Date of creation: Jul 2009
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Handle: RePEc:cra:wpaper:2009-16
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  1. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753, Junio.
  2. Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Ludger Schuknecht, 2005. "What does the European Union do?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(3), pages 275-319, June.
  3. Messal, Rüdiger & Klein, Armin, 1993. "Finanzlasten und Eigenmittelstruktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft," Wirtschaftsdienst – Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik (1949 - 2007), ZBW – German National Library of Economics / Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 73(7), pages 375-383.
  4. Widgren, Mika, 1991. "Voting Power in the EC Decision Making and the Consequencesof two Different Enlargements," Discussion Papers 377, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
  5. Johannes Clemens & Astrid Lemmer, 2006. "Financing the EU budget - Present situations and perspective," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 4(1), pages 39-44, 04.
  6. Bordignon, Massimo & Brusco, Sandro, 2006. "On enhanced cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(10-11), pages 2063-2090, November.
  7. André Sapir & Philippe Aghion & Giuseppe Bertola & Martin Hellwig & Jean Pisani-Ferry & Bernard Lange & José Viñals & Helen Wallace & Marco Buti & Mario Nava & Peter Smith, 2004. "An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8070, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  8. Madeleine o. Hosli, 1996. "Coallitions and Power: Effects of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 255-273, 06.
  9. Guido Tabellini & Elmar Brok, 2002. "Principles of policy making in a larger Europe: What constitution fits the union?," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 3(2), pages 16-25, October.
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