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Is civic duty the solution to the paradox of voting?

Author

Listed:
  • Abel François

    () (University of Lille
    LIEPP, Sciences Po)

  • Olivier Gergaud

    () (KEDGE Business School
    LIEPP, Sciences Po)

Abstract

Abstract Although sense of civic duty is seen by many scholars as the most obvious solution to the paradox of voting, very few empirical studies provide clear evidence on that motive. We use blood donation to build proxies, focusing only on intrinsic motivations, and then introduce such measures into electoral turnout regressions. Our results show that civic duty has a strong influence on voter turnout rates, confirming that the satisfaction voters receive from voting matters regardless of election outcomes. The results are even stronger when we incorporate the number of plasma and platelet donations, which take more time and require stronger commitments from donors.

Suggested Citation

  • Abel François & Olivier Gergaud, 2019. "Is civic duty the solution to the paradox of voting?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 180(3), pages 257-283, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:180:y:2019:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-018-00635-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-00635-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. Kenju Kamei & Louis Putterman & Jean-Robert Tyran, 2019. "Civic Engagement as a Second-Order Public Good: The Cooperative Underpinnings of the Accountable State," Discussion Papers 19-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    2. Stefanie Gäbler & Niklas Potrafke & Felix Rösel, 2019. "Compulsory Voting and Political Participation: Empirical Evidence from Austria," ifo Working Paper Series 315, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.

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