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The effects of party campaign spending under proportional representation: Evidence from Germany

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  • Fink, Alexander

Abstract

Most of the literature investigating the effects of campaign spending on electoral outcomes focuses on individual candidates in majoritarian systems. This paper contributes to the literature on the effectiveness of party campaign spending on party vote shares under systems of proportional representation. German data are used to test several hypotheses derived from a simple election contest model. The results are mixed and only partially support the hypothesis of a positive effect of campaign spending on a party's vote share.

Suggested Citation

  • Fink, Alexander, 2012. "The effects of party campaign spending under proportional representation: Evidence from Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 574-592.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:28:y:2012:i:4:p:574-592
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2012.05.009
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ade, Florian & Freier, Ronny & Odendahl, Christian, 2014. "Incumbency effects in government and opposition: Evidence from Germany," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 117-134.
    2. repec:bla:kyklos:v:70:y:2017:i:2:p:220-255 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Polk, Andreas, 2017. "Lobbyism in Germany: What do we know?," Beiträge zur Jahrestagung 2016 (Witten/Herdecke) 175190, Verein für Socialpolitik, Ausschuss für Wirtschaftssysteme und Institutionenökonomik.
    4. Kräkel, Matthias & Nieken, Petra & Przemeck, Judith, 2014. "Risk taking and investing in electoral competition," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 98-120.
    5. Freier, Ronny, 2015. "The mayor's advantage: Causal evidence on incumbency effects in German mayoral elections," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PA), pages 16-30.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Proportional representation; Campaign spending; Election contest model; Germany;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism

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