Constitutional Interests in the Face of Innovations: How Much Do We Need to Know about Risk Preferences?
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Other versions of this item:
- Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 203-225, September.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Schubert, Christian, 2017. "Green nudges: Do they work? Are they ethical?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 329-342.
- Viktor J. Vanberg, 2009. "Evolving Preferences and Policy Advice in Democratic Society," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-19, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Christian Schubert, 2009. "Welfare Creation and Destruction in a Schumpeterian World," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2009-14, Philipps University Marburg, Department of Geography.
- Binder, Martin & Witt, Ulrich, 2012. "A critical note on the role of the capability approach for sustainability economics," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 41(5), pages 721-725.
- Lars Osberg & Andrew Sharpe, 2014.
"Measuring Economic Insecurity in Rich and Poor Nations,"
Review of Income and Wealth,
International Association for Research in Income and Wealth, vol. 60(S1), pages 53-76, May.
- Lars Osberg & Andrew Sharpe, 2012. "Measuring Economic Insecurity in Rich and Poor Nations," CSLS Research Reports 2012-03, Centre for the Study of Living Standards.
- Vanberg Viktor J., 2014. "Evolving Preferences and Welfare Economics: The Perspective of Constitutional Political Economy," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 234(2-3), pages 328-349, April.
More about this item
Keywordsconstitutional preferences; social contract; original position; innovation; risk preferences Length 34 pages;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
- O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-IPR-2008-05-17 (Intellectual Property Rights)
- NEP-POL-2008-05-17 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-UPT-2008-05-17 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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