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Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice

Author

Listed:
  • Viktor Vanberg
  • James M. Buchanan

Abstract

The paper contrasts two interpretations of the role of agreement in politics, a social contract notion and a dialogue notion. It is argued that the two notions can be viewed as complementing each other if one explicitly separates two components in human choice that in rational choice theory are often inseparably blended in the concept of preferences - an interest-component and a theory component. It is suggested that the contractarian agreement notion primarily focusses on the interest-component; the dialogue notion on the theory-component in constitutional choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Viktor Vanberg & James M. Buchanan, 1989. "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 49-62, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:1:y:1989:i:1:p:49-62
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692889001001004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Heckathorn, Douglas D & Maser, Steven M, 1987. "Bargaining and the," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 69-98, Spring.
    2. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Heine Klaus & Mause Karsten, 2003. "Politikberatung als informationsökonomisches Problem," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 223(4), pages 479-490, August.
    2. Jan Schnellenbach, 2016. "A Constitutional Economics Perspective on Soft Paternalism," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 69(1), pages 135-156, February.
    3. Schneider, Friedrich G., 2009. "Is a Federal European Constitution for an enlarged European Union necessary? Some preliminary suggestions using public choice analysis," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 83, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    4. Himick, Darlene & Brivot, Marion, 2018. "Carriers of ideas in accounting standard-setting and financialization: The role of epistemic communities," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 29-44.
    5. Kenneth L. Avio, 1994. "Aboriginal Property Rights in Canada: A Contractarian Interpretation of R. v. Sparrow," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 20(4), pages 415-429, December.
    6. Vanberg, Viktor, 1990. "A Constitutional Political Economy Perspective on International Trade," 1990: The Environment, Government Policies, and International Trade Meeting, December 1990, San Diego, CA 50875, International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium.
    7. Berggren, Niclas & Karlson, Nils, 2003. "Constitutionalism, Division of Power and Transaction Costs," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 117(1-2), pages 99-124, October.
    8. Jan Schnellenbach, 2015. "Does classical liberalism imply an evolutionary approach to policy-making?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 53-70, April.
    9. Jan Schnellenbach, 2004. "The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 97-115, January.
    10. Müller Christian, 1999. "Brauchen wir einen Schleier der Unkenntnis?," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 50(1), pages 207-232, January.
    11. Andrew T. Young, 2019. "How Austrians can contribute to constitutional political economy (and why they should)," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 32(4), pages 281-293, December.
    12. Priddat Birger P., 2000. "„Communication of the Constraints on Action” K. J. Arrow über Kommunikation / „Communication of the Constraints on Action” K. J. Arrow on Communication," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 220(4), pages 453-470, August.
    13. Ulrich Witt & Christian Schubert, 2008. "Constitutional interests in the face of innovations: how much do we need to know about risk preferences?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 203-225, September.
    14. repec:got:cegedp:83 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Will, Matthias Georg & Pies, Ingo, 2014. "Discourse and regulation failures: The ambivalent influence of NGOs on political organizations," Discussion Papers 2014-2, Martin Luther University of Halle-Wittenberg, Chair of Economic Ethics.
    16. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
    17. Müller Christian, 2004. "Christliche Sozialethik und das Wertproblem in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften," ORDO. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, De Gruyter, vol. 55(1), pages 77-98, January.
    18. Karlson, Nils, 2012. "The Limits of Pragmatism in Institutional Change," Ratio Working Papers 194, The Ratio Institute.

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