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The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain

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  • Jan Schnellenbach

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  • Jan Schnellenbach, 2004. "The Evolution of a Fiscal Constitution When Individuals are Theoretically Uncertain," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 97-115, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:ejlwec:v:17:y:2004:i:1:p:97-115
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1026389926709
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Schnellenbach, Jan, 2002. "Tax Morale, Leviathan and the Political Process: A Theoretical Approach," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2002 163, Royal Economic Society.
    2. Figlio, David N & O'Sullivan, Arthur, 2001. "The Local Response to Tax Limitation Measures: Do Local Governments Manipulate Voters to Increase Revenues?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 233-257, April.
    3. Kirchgassner, Gebhard & Pommerehne, Werner W, 1993. "Low-Cost Decisions as a Challenge to Public Choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 77(1), pages 107-115, September.
    4. Brennan,Geoffrey & Buchanan,James M., 2006. "The Power to Tax," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027922, January.
    5. O'Sullivan,Arthur & Sexton,Terri A. & Sheffrin,Steven M., 2007. "Property Taxes and Tax Revolts," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521035996, January.
    6. Buchanan, James M, 1987. "The Constitution of Economic Policy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 243-250, June.
    7. Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
    8. Viktor Vanberg & James M. Buchanan, 1989. "Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 1(1), pages 49-62, January.
    9. Thomas Brenner, 1999. "Modelling Learning in Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1815.
    10. Stefan Voigt, 1999. "Explaining Constitutional Change," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1847.
    11. Michael Wohlgemuth, 2002. "Democracy and Opinion Falsification: Towards a New Austrian Political Economy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 223-246, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Schnellenbach, 2015. "Does classical liberalism imply an evolutionary approach to policy-making?," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 53-70, April.
    2. Choudhury, Atrayee & Sahu, Sohini, 2023. "Reconciling the mixed evidence in the fiscal decentralization-government size nexus using panel quantile regression," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    3. Schmidt, André, 2006. "Wie ökonomisch ist der "more economic approach"? Einige kritische Anmerkungen aus ordnungsökonomischer Sicht," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/10, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    4. Lars P. Feld & Horst Zimmermann & Thomas Döring, 2003. "Föderalismus, Dezentralität und Wirtschaftswachstum," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 72(3), pages 361-377.
    5. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2019. "The dynamics of political myths and ideologies," CIW Discussion Papers 1/2019, University of Münster, Center for Interdisciplinary Economics (CIW).
    6. Wohlgemuth, Michael, 2006. "Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft als Bedingungen für sozialen Fortschritt," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 06/1, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    7. Thushyanthan Baskaran & Lars P. Feld & Jan Schnellenbach, 2014. "Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and Economic Growth: Survey and Meta-Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 4985, CESifo.
    8. Kyriazis, Nicholas K. & Karayiannis, Anastassios D., 2011. "Democracy, Institutional Changes and Economic Development: The Case of Ancient Athens," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 61-91.
    9. Apolte, Thomas & Müller, Julia, 2022. "The persistence of political myths and ideologies," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 71(C).

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