Institutional changes and shifting ideas: a constitutional analysis of the Euro
This paper uses the logical tools of Constitutional Economics to analyze the creation of the Euro, considering the entire process as the outcome of a conflict between different rules or, if you will, between different monetary systems, moving from the system of flexible exchange rates to a system of fixed exchange rates and ultimately to the single currency. The conflict between monetary systems has been acted out according to the single states’ collective preference functions, with both full employment and price stability figuring among the weights of said preference functions. The “solution” of the single currency was conceived when the body of information available to the policymakers was “simplified” by the new classical macro-economy taking a hegemonic role. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007
Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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