Coercion and equity with centralization of government: how the unification of Italy impacted the southern regions
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DOI: 10.1007/s11127-018-0589-2
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- Nicola Pontarollo & Roberto Ricciuti, 2020. "Railways and manufacturing productivity in Italy after unification," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 775-800, September.
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Keywords
Fiscal coercion; Institutional arrangements; Italy’s unification;All these keywords.
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