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Tax Evasion across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?

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  • Brosio, Giorgio
  • Cassone, Alberto
  • Ricciuti, Roberto

Abstract

The paper suggests an explanation for the geographical dimension of tax evasion that focuses on the structure of territorial government. Taxes administered by the central government are not differentiated by regions. Poor areas may prefer a combination of lower taxes and lower levels of public services at both the central and the local level. This is especially true when income and wealth levels differ among the areas and the demand for publicly provided goods is correlated to these levels. But the use of nationally uniform tax schedules imposes a welfare burden on poorer areas. While the tax rates of local taxes can be adjusted to local preferences, tax evasion may be tacitly accepted as a compensation for the welfare loss deriving from too high centrally set tax rates. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Brosio, Giorgio & Cassone, Alberto & Ricciuti, Roberto, 2002. "Tax Evasion across Italy: Rational Noncompliance or Inadequate Civic Concern?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 112(3-4), pages 259-273, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:112:y:2002:i:3-4:p:259-73
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Ausloos & Roy Cerqueti & Tariq A. Mir, 2017. "Data science for assessing possible tax income manipulation: The case of Italy," Papers 1709.02129, arXiv.org.
    2. Tariq Ahmad Mir & Marcel Ausloos & Roy Cerqueti, 2014. "Benford's law predicted digit distribution of aggregated income taxes: the surprising conformity of Italian cities and regions," Papers 1410.2890, arXiv.org.
    3. Kastlunger, Barbara & Lozza, Edoardo & Kirchler, Erich & Schabmann, Alfred, 2013. "Powerful authorities and trusting citizens: The Slippery Slope Framework and tax compliance in Italy," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 36-45.
    4. Ugo Albertazzi & Ginette Eramo & Leonardo Gambacorta & Carmelo Salleo, 2011. "Securitization is not that evil after all," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 796, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Albertazzi, Ugo & Eramo, Ginette & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Salleo, Carmelo, 2015. "Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 33-49.
    6. Ehtisham Ahmad & Giorgio Brosio & Vito Tanzi, 2008. "Local Service Provision in Selected OECD Countries; Do Decentralized Operations Work Better?," IMF Working Papers 08/67, International Monetary Fund.
    7. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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