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Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment

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  • Albertazzi, Ugo
  • Eramo, Ginette
  • Gambacorta, Leonardo
  • Salleo, Carmelo

Abstract

Asymmetric information in securitization deals is analyzed based on a unique dataset comprising a million mortgages, both securitized and not, and using a methodology, previously applied to insurance data, that looks at the correlation between risk transfer and default probability. The main finding is that, for given observable characteristics, securitized mortgages have a lower default probability than non-securitized ones. We show that this finding is consistent with banks caring about their reputation for not selling lemons.

Suggested Citation

  • Albertazzi, Ugo & Eramo, Ginette & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Salleo, Carmelo, 2015. "Asymmetric information in securitization: An empirical assessment," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 33-49.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:moneco:v:71:y:2015:i:c:p:33-49
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jmoneco.2014.11.002
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    Cited by:

    1. Yener Altunbas & Michiel van Leuvensteijn & David Marques-Ibanez, 2013. "Competition And Bank Risk: The Role Of Securitization And Bank Capital," Working Papers 13005, Bangor Business School, Prifysgol Bangor University (Cymru / Wales).
    2. Gregory S. Crawford & Nicola Pavanini & Fabiano Schivardi, 2018. "Asymmetric Information and Imperfect Competition in Lending Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(7), pages 1659-1701, July.
    3. Bindseil, Ulrich & Corsi, Marco & Sahel, Benjamin & Visser, Ad, 2017. "The Eurosystem collateral framework explained," Occasional Paper Series 189, European Central Bank.
    4. Alper Kara & David Marques‐Ibanez & Steven Ongena, 2019. "Securitization and credit quality in the European market," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 25(2), pages 407-434, March.
    5. Ambrose, Brent W. & Coulson, N. Edward & Yoshida, Jiro, 2018. "Reassessing Taylor rules using improved housing rent data," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 243-257.
    6. Elizabeth C. Klee & Chae Hee Shin, 2020. "Post-crisis Signals in Securitization: Evidence from Auto ABS," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-042, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    7. Jedidi, Helmi & Dionne, Georges, 2019. "Testing for information asymmetry in the mortgage servicing market," Working Papers 19-1, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management, revised 28 Oct 2019.
    8. Kara, Alper & Marques-Ibanez, David & Ongena, Steven, 2016. "Securitization and lending standards: Evidence from the European wholesale loan market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 107-127.
    9. Alper Kara & David Marques-Ibanez & Steven Ongena, 2015. "Securitization and Credit Quality," International Finance Discussion Papers 1148, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 03 Nov 2015.
    10. Fabio Panetta & Alberto Franco Pozzolo, 2018. "Why do banks securitise their assets? Bank-level evidence from over one hundred countries in the pre-crisis period," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1183, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    11. Amzallag, Adrien & Calza, Alessandro & Georgarakos, Dimitris & Sousa, João, 2019. "Monetary policy transmission to mortgages in a negative interest rate environment," Working Paper Series 2243, European Central Bank.
    12. Boesel, Nils & Kool, Clemens & Lugo, Stefano, 2018. "Do European banks with a covered bond program issue asset-backed securities for funding?," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 76-87.
    13. Ugo Albertazzi & Margherita Bottero & Leonardo Gambacorta & Steven Ongena, 2016. "Asymmetric information and the securitization of SME loans," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1091, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    14. Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2017. "Securitisation, credit risk and lending standards revisited," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 32.
    15. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "Do reputable issuers provide better-quality securitizations?," Working Paper Series 2236, European Central Bank.
    16. Ma, Chao, 2020. "Per-customer quantity limit and price discrimination: Evidence from the U.S. residential mortgage market," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    17. Nils Boesel & C.J.M. Kool & S. Lugo, 2016. "Do European Banks with a Covered Bond Program still issue Asset-Backed Securities for funding?," Working Papers 16-03, Utrecht School of Economics.
    18. Sascha Tobias Wengerek & Benjamin Hippert & André Uhde, 2019. "Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans," Working Papers Dissertations 58, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.
    19. Gaudêncio, João & Mazany, Agnieszka & Schwarz, Claudia, 2019. "The impact of lending standards on default rates of residential real estate loans," Occasional Paper Series 220, European Central Bank.
    20. Jorge E. Galán & Matías Lamas, 2019. "Beyond the LTV ratio: new macroprudential lessons from Spain," Working Papers 1931, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
    21. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Securitization; Asymmetric information; Reputation;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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