IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Are bank loans still “special” (especially during a crisis)? Empirical evidence from a European country

  • Christophe Godlewski

    ()

    (LaRGE Research Center, Université de Strasbourg)

We investigate bank loans’ specialness with a particular focus on the recent boom and bust cycle. We perform an empirical analysis using event study methodology on a sample of 253 large loan announcements for French borrowers between January 2000 and December 2009. We find a significant and negative reaction to bank loan announcements which is mostly driven by loan provided during the crisis period. We also document significant changes in bank behavior over the boom and bust cycle, with important contractual and organizational modifications reflecting a potential “wake-up call” of banks during the crisis.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://ifs.u-strasbg.fr/large/publications/2012/2012-03.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg in its series Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center with number 2012-03.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2012-03
Contact details of provider: Postal: 61, Avenue de la Forêt Noire, F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex
Phone: (33) 3 90 41 41 30
Fax: (33) 3 90 41 40 50
Web page: http://ifs.unistra.fr/large

More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Dell’Ariccia, G. & Igan, D. & Laeven, L., 2009. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards : Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Discussion Paper 2009-46 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Michael Brei & Leonardo Gambacorta & Goetz von Peter, 2011. "Rescue packages and bank lending," BIS Working Papers 357, Bank for International Settlements.
  3. Godlewski, Christophe J. & Fungacova, Zuzana & Weill, Laurent, 2010. "Stock market reaction to debt financing arrangements in Russia," BOFIT Discussion Papers 16/2010, Bank of Finland, Institute for Economies in Transition.
  4. Allen N. Berger & Leora F. Klapper & Gregory F. Udell, 2001. "The ability of banks to lend to informationally opaque small businesses," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2001-34, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  5. Ralph de Haas & Neeltje van Horen, 2010. "The crisis as a wake-up call. Do banks tighten screening and monitoring during a financial crisis?," DNB Working Papers 255, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  6. Stephen A. Ross, 1977. "The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 23-40, Spring.
  7. Bosch, Oliver & Steffen, Sascha, 2011. "On syndicate composition, corporate structure and the certification effect of credit ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 290-299, February.
  8. Huang, Weihua & Schwienbacher, Armin & Zhao, Shan, 2012. "When bank loans are bad news: Evidence from market reactions to loan announcements under the risk of expropriation," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 233-252.
  9. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362, February.
  10. Christophe Godlewski, 2009. "L’organisation des syndicats bancaires en France:taille, concentration et réputation," Revue Finance Contrôle Stratégie, revues.org, vol. 12(3), pages 37-63, September.
  11. Gambacorta, Leonardo & Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, 2004. "Does bank capital affect lending behavior?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 436-457, October.
  12. repec:cup:jfinqa:v:46:y:2011:i:06:p:1795-1830_00 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Christophe J. Godlewski & Frédéric Lobez & Jean-Christophe Statnik, 2010. "Better borrowers, fewer banks?," Working Papers of LaRGE Research Center 2010-02, Laboratoire de Recherche en Gestion et Economie (LaRGE), Université de Strasbourg.
  14. Zuzana Fungáčová & Christophe J. Godlewski & Laurent Weill, 2011. "Asymmetric Information and Loan Spreads in Russia," Eastern European Economics, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 49(1), pages 13-29, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lar:wpaper:2012-03. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christophe J. Godlewski)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.