Information asymmetry and self-selection bias in bank loan announcement studies
Event-study driven research has produced a consensus that loans are unique relative to other financial contracts. But these studies assume that small samples of loan announcements adequately represent the loan population. We find that loan announcements are rare and driven by factors such as information asymmetry and perceived materiality. We show that the sample used by Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) fails to represent the loan universe and that significant abnormal announcement returns are confined to their smallest firms. Our sample, which better represents the loan population, produces an abnormal return insignificantly different from zero. The findings suggest that self-selection bias affects extant loan announcement research and do not support the views that loans are a special form of finance or that private and public debt differ in significant ways. Were all loans to be announced, the average abnormal return would likely be insignificant.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- James, Christopher, 1987. "Some evidence on the uniqueness of bank loans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 217-235, December.
- Krishnaswami, Sudha & Subramaniam, Venkat, 1999. "Information asymmetry, valuation, and the corporate spin-off decision," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 73-112, July.
- Lummer, Scott L. & McConnell, John J., 1989. "Further evidence on the bank lending process and the capital-market response to bank loan agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 99-122, November.
- Chung, Kee H. & Zhang, Hao, 2014. "A simple approximation of intraday spreads using daily data," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 17(C), pages 94-120.
- Kee, H. Chung & McInish, Thomas H. & Wood, Robert A. & Wyhowski, Donald J., 1995. "Production of information, information asymmetry, and the bid-ask spread: Empirical evidence from analysts' forecasts," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(6), pages 1025-1046, September.
- Diamond, Douglas W, 1985. " Optimal Release of Information by Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 40(4), pages 1071-1094, September.
- Sreedhar T. Bharath & Paolo Pasquariello & Guojun Wu, 2009. "Does Asymmetric Information Drive Capital Structure Decisions?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(8), pages 3211-3243, August.
- Leary, Mark T. & Roberts, Michael R., 2010. "The pecking order, debt capacity, and information asymmetry," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(3), pages 332-355, March.
- Verrecchia, Robert E., 2001. "Essays on disclosure," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 97-180, December.
- Easley, David & Hvidkjaer, Soeren & O’Hara, Maureen, 2010. "Factoring Information into Returns," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(02), pages 293-309, April.
- Preece, Dianna & Mullineaux, Donald J., 1996. "Monitoring, loan renegotiability, and firm value: The role of lending syndicates," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 577-593, April.
- Pankaj Maskara & Donald Mullineaux, 2011. "Small Firm Capital Structure and the Syndicated Loan Market," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 39(1), pages 55-70, April.
- Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1991. " Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(4), pages 1325-1359, September.
- Billett, Matthew T. & Flannery, Mark J. & Garfinkel, Jon A., 2006. "Are Bank Loans Special? Evidence on the Post-Announcement Performance of Bank Borrowers," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 41(04), pages 733-751, December.
- Focarelli, Dario & Pozzolo, Alberto Franco & Casolaro, Luca, 2008. "The pricing effect of certification on syndicated loans," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(2), pages 335-349, March.
- Fama, Eugene F., 1985. "What's different about banks?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 29-39, January.
- Dierkens, Nathalie, 1991. "Information Asymmetry and Equity Issues," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 26(02), pages 181-199, June.
- Krishnaswami, Sudha & Spindt, Paul A. & Subramaniam, Venkat, 1999. "Information asymmetry, monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 407-434, March.
- Billett, Matthew T & Flannery, Mark J & Garfinkel, Jon A, 1995. " The Effect of Lender Identity on a Borrowing Firm's Equity Return," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(2), pages 699-718, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jfinec:v:101:y:2011:i:3:p:684-694. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.