IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article

On syndicate composition, corporate structure and the certification effect of credit ratings

  • Bosch, Oliver
  • Steffen, Sascha

We assess the relative importance of ratings versus stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetry using a dataset of syndicated loans to public and private firms in the UK. We find that the certification effect of ratings is largest for private firms and that syndicates are smallest if firms are privately held or unrated. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of being stock exchange listed is insignificant once these firms are rated. Exploiting the heterogeneity among lenders, we find that especially foreign bank and non-bank investors do not provide capital if firms are unrated. Our paper highlights the information produced by rating agencies as an important mechanism by which ratings improve access to capital. Our results also emphasize the importance of syndicate moral hazard on the supply of uninformed capital: bank-borrower relationships significantly increase the loan share syndicated to investors particularly if firms are not listed and unrated.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378-4266(10)00303-1
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Banking & Finance.

Volume (Year): 35 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 290-299

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:2:p:290-299
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jbf

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Boot, Arnoud W A & Milbourn, Todd, 2002. "Credit Ratings as Coordination Mechanism," CEPR Discussion Papers 3331, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Boubakri, Narjess & Ghouma, Hatem, 2010. "Control/ownership structure, creditor rights protection, and the cost of debt financing: International evidence," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(10), pages 2481-2499, October.
  3. João A. C. Santos & Andrew Winton, 2008. "Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1315-1359, 06.
  4. Champagne, Claudia & Kryzanowski, Lawrence, 2007. "Are current syndicated loan alliances related to past alliances?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(10), pages 3145-3161, October.
  5. Hand, John R M & Holthausen, Robert W & Leftwich, Richard W, 1992. " The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 733-52, June.
  6. Mark Carey & Mitch Post & Steven A. Sharpe, 1998. "Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on Specialization in Private Debt Contracting," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(3), pages 845-878, 06.
  7. Boot, Arnoud W. A., 2000. "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 7-25, January.
  8. Hale, Galina & Santos, João A.C., 2008. "The decision to first enter the public bond market: The role of firm reputation, funding choices, and bank relationships," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(9), pages 1928-1940, September.
  9. Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, 2004. "Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
  10. Jonathan D. Jones & William W. Lang & Peter J. Nigro, 2005. "Agent Bank Behavior In Bank Loan Syndications," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(3), pages 385-402.
  11. Ram T. S. Ramakrishnan & Anjan V. Thakor, 1984. "Information Reliability and a Theory of Financial Intermediation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 415-432.
  12. Darren J. Kisgen, 2006. "Credit Ratings and Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1035-1072, 06.
  13. Katerina Simons, 1993. "Why do banks syndicate loans?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 45-52.
  14. Ederington, Louis H. & Goh, Jeremy C., 1998. "Bond Rating Agencies and Stock Analysts: Who Knows What When?," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(04), pages 569-585, December.
  15. Amir Sufi, 2009. "The Real Effects of Debt Certification: Evidence from the Introduction of Bank Loan Ratings," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(4), pages 1659-1691, April.
  16. Norden, L. & Wagner, W.B., 2007. "Credit Derivatives and Loan Pricing," Discussion Paper 2007-015, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  17. Ivashina, Victoria, 2009. "Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 300-319, May.
  18. Jorion, Philippe & Liu, Zhu & Shi, Charles, 2005. "Informational effects of regulation FD: evidence from rating agencies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 309-330, May.
  19. Megginson, William L & Weiss, Kathleen A, 1991. " Venture Capitalist Certification in Initial Public Offerings," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(3), pages 879-903, July.
  20. Michael Faulkender & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2003. "Does the Source of Capital Affect Capital Structure?," NBER Working Papers 9930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
  22. Maskara, Pankaj Kumar, 2010. "Economic value in tranching of syndicated loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 946-955, May.
  23. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
  24. Esty, Benjamin C. & Megginson, William L., 2003. "Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 37-60, March.
  25. Jun Qian & Philip E. Strahan, 2005. "How Law and Institutions Shape Financial Contracts: The Case of Bank Loans," NBER Working Papers 11052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  26. Ha-Chin Yi & Donald J. Mullineaux, 2006. "The Informational Role Of Bank Loan Ratings," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 29(4), pages 481-501.
  27. Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, 04.
  28. Dennis, Steven A. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2000. "Syndicated Loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 404-426, October.
  29. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jbfina:v:35:y:2011:i:2:p:290-299. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.