IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/finlet/v15y2015icp115-124.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cultural differences and the structure of loan syndicates

Author

Listed:
  • Kleimeier, Stefanie
  • Chaudhry, Sajid M.

Abstract

Do cultural differences between lender and borrower affect the structure of the loan syndicate? Analyzing 8031 syndicated loans to US borrowers signed between 1986 and 2007, we find that lending shares are higher for foreign arrangers than domestic arrangers. Among foreign arrangers, lending shares further increase with cultural distance. We interpret this as a result of an increased moral hazard problem driven by higher information and effort costs faced by foreign arrangers. However, previous interactions between borrowers and arrangers can reduce moral hazard, hence culturally distant arrangers are able to form diffused syndicates.

Suggested Citation

  • Kleimeier, Stefanie & Chaudhry, Sajid M., 2015. "Cultural differences and the structure of loan syndicates," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 15(C), pages 115-124.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:15:y:2015:i:c:p:115-124
    DOI: 10.1016/j.frl.2015.09.001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1544612315000859
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Glick, Reuven & Rose, Andrew K., 2002. "Does a currency union affect trade? The time-series evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(6), pages 1125-1151, June.
    2. Nicholas Bloom & Raffaella Sadun, 2012. "The Organization of Firms Across Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 127(4), pages 1663-1705.
    3. Mehmet Fatih Ekinci & Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan & Bent E. Sørensen, 2009. "Financial Integration within EU Countries: The Role of Institutions, Confidence and Trust," NBER Chapters,in: NBER International Seminar on Macroeconomics 2007, pages 325-391 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    5. Dennis, Steven A. & Mullineaux, Donald J., 2000. "Syndicated Loans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 404-426, October.
    6. Andrew K. Rose, 2004. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 98-114, March.
    7. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-691.
    8. Haselmann, Rainer & Wachtel, Paul, 2011. "Foreign banks in syndicated loan markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(10), pages 2679-2689, October.
    9. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2009. "Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 124(3), pages 1095-1131.
    10. Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2000. "Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 679-713, April.
    11. Sang Whi Lee & Donald J. Mullineaux, 2004. "Monitoring, Financial Distress, and the Structure of Commercial Lending Syndicates," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 33(3), Fall.
    12. David Gaddis Ross, 2010. "The "Dominant Bank Effect:" How High Lender Reputation Affects the Information Content and Terms of Bank Loans," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(7), pages 2730-2756, July.
    13. Esty, Benjamin C. & Megginson, William L., 2003. "Creditor Rights, Enforcement, and Debt Ownership Structure: Evidence from the Global Syndicated Loan Market," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(01), pages 37-60, March.
    14. Stulz, Rene M. & Williamson, Rohan, 2003. "Culture, openness, and finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 313-349, December.
    15. Sylvia Heuchemer & Stefanie Kleimeier & Harald Sander, 2009. "The Determinants of Cross-Border Lending in the Euro Zone," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 51(4), pages 467-499, December.
    16. Buch, Claudia M. & Lipponer, Alexander, 2007. "FDI versus exports: Evidence from German banks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 805-826, March.
    17. Kamphol Panyagometh & Gordon S. Roberts, 2010. "Do Lead Banks Exploit Syndicate Participants? Evidence from Ex Post Risk," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 39(1), pages 273-299, March.
    18. Ivashina, Victoria, 2009. "Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 300-319, May.
    19. Hans Degryse & Steven Ongena, 2005. "Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(1), pages 231-266, February.
    20. Amir Sufi, 2007. "Information Asymmetry and Financing Arrangements: Evidence from Syndicated Loans," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 629-668, April.
    21. Ivashina, Victoria & Scharfstein, David, 2010. "Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(3), pages 319-338, September.
    22. William Wilhelm & Pegaret Pichler, 2001. "A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function," Economics Series Working Papers 2001-FE-05, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    23. Anthony Coleman & Neil Esho & Ian Sharpe, 2006. "Does Bank Monitoring Influence Loan Contract Terms?," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 30(2), pages 177-198, October.
    24. Maskara, Pankaj Kumar, 2010. "Economic value in tranching of syndicated loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(5), pages 946-955, May.
    25. Katerina Simons, 1993. "Why do banks syndicate loans?," New England Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, issue Jan, pages 45-52.
    26. Jonathan D. Jones & William W. Lang & Peter J. Nigro, 2005. "Agent Bank Behavior In Bank Loan Syndications," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 28(3), pages 385-402.
    27. Siegel, Jordan I. & Licht, Amir N. & Schwartz, Shalom H., 2011. "Egalitarianism and international investment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 621-642.
    28. Bosch, Oliver & Steffen, Sascha, 2011. "On syndicate composition, corporate structure and the certification effect of credit ratings," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 290-299, February.
    29. Knyazeva, Anzhela & Knyazeva, Diana, 2012. "Does being your bank’s neighbor matter?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(4), pages 1194-1209.
    30. Mariassunta Giannetti & Yishay Yafeh, 2012. "Do Cultural Differences Between Contracting Parties Matter? Evidence from Syndicated Bank Loans," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(2), pages 365-383, February.
    31. anonymous, 2000. "Increase in adversely classified syndicated bank loans," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Jan, pages 1-42.
    32. Champagne, Claudia & Coggins, Frank, 2012. "Common information asymmetry factors in syndicated loan structures," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 1437-1451.
    33. Atif Mian, 2006. "Distance Constraints: The Limits of Foreign Lending in Poor Economies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(3), pages 1465-1505, June.
    34. Paola Sapienza & Anna Toldra‐Simats & Luigi Zingales, 2013. "Understanding Trust," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(12), pages 1313-1332, December.
    35. Lee, Sang Whi & Kwag, Seung-Woog (Austin) & Mullineaux, Donald J. & Park, Kwangwoo, 2010. "Financial distress, information asymmetry, and syndicate structure: Evidence from Japanese borrowers," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 119-126, June.
    36. Mitchell A. Petersen & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2002. "Does Distance Still Matter? The Information Revolution in Small Business Lending," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(6), pages 2533-2570, December.
    37. Douglas W. Diamond, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414.
    38. Lin, Chen & Ma, Yue & Malatesta, Paul & Xuan, Yuhai, 2012. "Corporate ownership structure and bank loan syndicate structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 1-22.
    39. Schure, Paul & Scoones, David & Gu, Qinghua, 2005. "A theory of loan syndication," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 165-172, September.
    40. Sumit Agarwal, 2010. "Distance and Private Information in Lending," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(7), pages 2757-2788, July.
    41. Pegaret Pichler & William Wilhelm, 2001. "A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function," OFRC Working Papers Series 2001fe05, Oxford Financial Research Centre.
    42. Robert Hauswald & Robert Marquez, 2006. "Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition in Credit Markets," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 19(3), pages 967-1000.
    43. Pegaret Pichler, 2001. "A Theory of the Syndicate: Form Follows Function," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(6), pages 2237-2264, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Syndicated loans; Syndicate structure; Culture; Information asymmetry; Moral hazard;

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • F30 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - General
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:finlet:v:15:y:2015:i:c:p:115-124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Dana Niculescu). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/frl .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.