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The Debt‐Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure

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  • RYAN BALL
  • ROBERT M. BUSHMAN
  • FLORIN P. VASVARI

Abstract

We investigate how both the ownership structure and explicit contractual structure of syndicated loan deals are shaped by the debt‐contracting value (DCV) of borrowers' accounting information. DCV captures the inherent ability of firms' accounting numbers to capture credit quality deterioration in a timely fashion. We hypothesize and document that when a borrower's accounting information possesses higher DCV, information asymmetry between the lead arranger and other syndicate participants is lower, allowing lead arrangers to hold a smaller proportion of new loan deals. Further, we document that the influence of DCV on the proportion of the loan retained is conditional on the lead arranger's reputation, the existence of a credit rating, and the lead arranger's previous relationships with the same borrower. Finally, we find that when loans include performance pricing provisions, the likelihood that the single performance measure used is an accounting ratio, rather than a credit rating, is increasing in DCV.

Suggested Citation

  • Ryan Ball & Robert M. Bushman & Florin P. Vasvari, 2008. "The Debt‐Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 247-287, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:joares:v:46:y:2008:i:2:p:247-287
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2008.00273.x
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